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ABOUT THIS REPORT 
Since the late 1990s, issues surrounding race and employment have been a central research 
focus at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Center for Economic Development 
(UWMCED). In a series of reports, the Center has analyzed racial disparities in employment in 
the Milwaukee region, and the Center has been instrumental in calling public attention to 
Milwaukee’s continuing lag, compared to other Northeast-Midwest metropolises, in generating 
employment growth in the African American community. This study, focusing on the crisis of 
joblessness among working-age black males, is the Center’s most exhaustive study yet on 
Milwaukee’s central economic development challenge: closing the racial gap in employment that 
plagues this region.  
The author of this report is Dr. Marc V. Levine, Professor of History and Urban Studies, 
and Director of the UWMCED. Lauren McHargue, a policy analyst at the Center, provided 
important research and production assistance. 
UWMCED is a unit of the College of Letters and Science at the University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee. The College established UWMCED in 1990, to provide university research and 
technical assistance to community organizations and units of government working to improve the 
Greater Milwaukee economy. The analysis and conclusions presented in this report are solely 
those of UWMCED and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of UW-Milwaukee, or 
any of the organizations providing financial support to the Center. 
The UWMCED strongly believes that informed public debate is vital to the development of 
good public policy. The Center publishes briefing papers, detailed analyses of economic trends 
and policies, and “technical assistance” reports on issues of applied economic development. In 
these ways, as well as in conferences and public lectures sponsored by the Center, we hope to 
contribute to public discussion on economic development policy in Southeastern Wisconsin. 
Further information about the Center and its reports and activities is available at our web 
site: www.ced.uwm.edu
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 Executive Summary 
 
There is no greater economic challenge facing Milwaukee than the crisis of joblessness 
among black males in the city. This study presents the most up-to-date analysis available of 
recent trends, examining racial disparities in the city and regional labor markets, and placing 
Milwaukee’s record in comparative and historical context. Our chief finding is that Milwaukee’s 
30-year trend of near-linear growth in black male joblessness peaked in the city in 2003 at 51.3 
percent and declined to 44.1 percent by 2005. In addition, by 2005, racial disparities narrowed 
somewhat in the city and region, and Milwaukee’s black-white employment gap moved closer to 
the average of other Northeast-Midwest cities and metropolitan areas. Nevertheless, the black 
male jobless rate remains unacceptably high in Milwaukee, with black male joblessness here 
ranking second highest among comparable Northeast-Midwest metropolitan areas in 2005. Civic 
leadership in Milwaukee, we contend, continues to lack the vision, policies, and institutions to 
comprehensively attack and meaningfully alleviate the crisis of race and jobs in the city and 
region. 
This report contains three main sections. First, we present the most current data on trends in 
black male joblessness and racial disparities in employment, for Milwaukee as well as a pool of 
“benchmark” cities and regions. Second, we analyze how the confluence of three key factors –
suburbanization, hyper-segregation, and deindustrialization-- has shaped the particularly sharp 
racial disparities in the Milwaukee labor market. Finally, we examine the shortcomings of 
existing policies and strategies and identify some promising alternative policy options.  
Our key findings: 
I. Race and Male Joblessness in Milwaukee: 2005 
The jobless rate for working-age black males (ages 16-64) in metropolitan Milwaukee region 
stood at 43.1 percent in 2005, a small decline from 46.5 percent in 2002. White male joblessness 
increased slightly between 2002-2005 in metro Milwaukee and thus, combined with the decline 
in black male joblessness during this period, the region’s racial gap in joblessness shrank by 
almost five percentage points. 
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A huge racial gap in male joblessness exists in all age categories in metro Milwaukee, from 
teenage workers to prime working-age adults. Black male joblessness not only exceeds the white 
rate by at least 20 percentage points in all age groupings, but the jobless rate among black males 
also is significantly higher than for Hispanic males in metro Milwaukee, particularly among 
younger workers. 
 
Table 1 
Male Joblessness in Metropolitan Milwaukee, 2002-2005 
(percentage of working-age males  unemployed or not in the labor force) 
 
YEAR BLACK WHITE HISPANIC 
2002 46.5% 18.7% 25.6% 
2005 43.1% 20.1% 29.3% 
 
There is a sharp regional/racial polarization of Milwaukee’s male labor market, with the 
largest gaps in jobless rates separating white suburbanites from black residents of the central 
city. For example, among prime working-age males (ages 25-54), the jobless rate for white 
suburbanites in 2005 was 11.8 percent, compared to 34.6 percent black males living in the city of 
Milwaukee. 
 
II. Race and Joblessness in Milwaukee: A Comparative Perspective, 
2002-2005 
 
Despite modest improvements between 2002-2005, the rate of black male joblessness in the 
Milwaukee region remains near the highest of Northeast-Midwest metropolitan areas, and in 
2005 the racial gap in male joblessness was, with the exception of metro Pittsburgh, the widest 
among “Frostbelt” metropolitan areas. 
In 2002, Milwaukee registered the highest working-age black male jobless rate among the 15 
“Frostbelt” metropolitan areas against which we benchmarked Milwaukee’s performance among 
these regions; in 2005, Milwaukee recorded the second highest black male jobless rate. The gap 
in Milwaukee separating white and black rates of male joblessness, which was 27.8 percentage 
points in 2002, the highest in the Frostbelt in 2002, declined to 23.0 points in 2005, which 
nevertheless placed Milwaukee second worst among our benchmark regions. 
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Milwaukee’s ranking on these indicators is somewhat better when comparisons are at the city 
level, but city-to-city comparisons are somewhat misleading, because in metro Milwaukee, 
unlike elsewhere in the Frostbelt, there has been virtually no suburbanization of the working-age 
black male population.  
Table 2: 
Black Male Jobless Rates in Selected Metropolitan Areas: 2002-2005 
Percentage of working-age (16-64) black males either 
 unemployed or out of the labor force 
 
2002 2005 
Baltimore N/A Boston 28.3% 
Minneapolis N/A Baltimore 31.6% 
Cincinnati N/A Indianapolis 34.4% 
Indianapolis 30.8% Kansas City 34.9% 
Pittsburgh 31.9% Minneapolis 35.9% 
Cleveland 32.3% Cincinnati 36.3% 
Boston 36.4% Philadelphia 39.7% 
Detroit 39.0% St. Louis 40.1% 
Kansas City 39.1% Buffalo 40.4% 
Philadelphia 39.7% Chicago 42.1% 
Chicago 41.1% Detroit 42.7% 
St. Louis 42.8% Cleveland 42.7% 
Buffalo 45.7% Milwaukee 43.1% 
Milwaukee 46.5% Pittsburgh 48.3% 
Average 38.7% Average 39.1% 
 
 
III. Black Male Joblessness in Milwaukee, 1970-2005: Historical 
Development and Explanatory Factors 
 
The rise in joblessness among working-age black males in Milwaukee during the past 35 
years has been relentless, increasing substantially at each census measurement until reaching a 
staggering 51.5 percent in 2003 (before improving to 44.1 percent by 2005). 
Perhaps even more striking has been the growth in joblessness among prime working-age 
black males in Milwaukee since 1970. Joblessness among males between the ages of 25-54 is 
particularly revealing of the state of the local labor market; we’re much less likely to see, in this 
age group, potential workers voluntarily absent from the labor market because of schooling, 
retirement, or homemaking. 
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The jobless rate for prime working-age black males was 15.2 percent in 1970, relatively 
modest by historical standards, albeit double the rate for white city residents and almost 
quadruple the rate for white suburbanites. However, as has been the case for all working-age 
black males, joblessness among prime-working age black males has grown ceaselessly in 
Milwaukee since 1970, peaking at an astonishing 40.8 percent in 2003, before improving to 34.6 
percent by 2005. 
Three key factors underlie the crisis of black male joblessness in Milwaukee: 
• Deindustrialization: Manufacturing was a critical source of jobs for Milwaukee’s 
black males through the 1970s, and, to a greater degree than almost anywhere else in 
the Frostbelt, industrial decline fundamentally diminished black male employment 
opportunities in the city; 
• Suburbanization of Jobs: Since 1980, all of the net job growth in metro Milwaukee 
has been in the suburbs, with the largest increases in the exurban counties (up 81 
percent). The city of Milwaukee has lost almost 18 percent of its job base since 1980. 
• Racial Segregation: The suburbanization of jobs in metropolitan Milwaukee, 
especially in manufacturing, has combined with the region’s entrenched residential 
segregation to produce a “spatial mismatch” in the regional labor market. This 
mismatch has severely limited employment possibilities for the region’s black males. 
The overwhelming majority (92%) of the region’s working-age black males live in a 
city with an eroding employment base, while all of the net job growth in the region is 
occurring in exurban areas where few blacks live and to which city-based minority 
workers have minimal transportation access. Through 2000, just over 8,500 black 
workers in metropolitan Milwaukee –only 11 percent of all black workers in the 
region—had secured employment in the exurban counties, representing a tiny fraction 
of the exurban workforce. By contrast, 43.1 percent of the region’s white workers 
were employed in the exurban counties in 2000. 
Two other factors –disparities in educational attainment as well as the age structure of 
Milwaukee’s black male community-- also help explain both racial differences in male 
joblessness in Milwaukee, as well as why the employment picture for black males is especially 
dismal here compared to other cities and regions. 
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There is a substantial racial gap in male educational attainment in Milwaukee; in the 
metropolitan area, for example, white males are almost three times as likely as black males to 
hold college, professional, or advanced degrees, a disparity that mirrors the racial disparity in 
male joblessness. 
Milwaukee’s working-age black male population is, on average, younger and less educated 
than counterparts elsewhere in the Frostbelt; since joblessness rates are higher among the young 
and less educated, this demographic factor also helps explain Milwaukee’s high rate of black 
male joblessness. 
 
IV. Local Policy and the Crisis of Black Male Joblessness in 
Milwaukee 
 
Milwaukee Mayor Tom Barrett and the region’s corporate leadership in the GMC and 
MMAC appear to have settled into a three-pronged “jobs strategy” to combat predominantly 
minority inner city joblessness: workforce development, minority entrepreneurship, and 
regionalism. All are worthy policy objectives and, in principle, can contribute to improving the 
local labor market. All, however, are deeply flawed as cornerstones of a local jobs strategy; in 
particular, without other more direct job creation policies (“demand-side”), these (‘supply side”) 
approaches are unlikely to have a significant impact on the crisis of black male joblessness in 
Milwaukee. 
• Milwaukee’s recent history, as is the case nationwide, is littered with disappointing 
results from job training programs. Workforce development is predicated on the 
fallacious assumptions that enough jobs exist for properly trained workers, or that 
with adequate training enough private-sector jobs will materialize for all workers. In 
fact, in 2005, by conservative estimate, there were 88,294 more jobless than 
available jobs in metro Milwaukee; there were six jobless Milwaukeeans for every 
available job in 2005; there were an astounding nine jobless for every available full-
time job. The primary need in Milwaukee is not improved job training, but rather 
policies that increase the demand for low- to moderate-skilled labor and attack the 
critical shortage of available jobs in the region. 
• Minority entrepreneurship offers little prospect of improving the employment picture 
for working-age black males.  In the 50 largest metro areas in the country, there is no 
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evidence that high rates of black business ownership produce low rates of black 
joblessness. Black-owned businesses employ a tiny fraction of workers (less than 
one percent in Milwaukee), so even huge growth in black-owned businesses would 
have a trivial impact on the black jobless rate. 
• M-7 “regionalism” could contribute significantly to alleviating the crisis of black 
male joblessness. But, so far, the M-7 seems focused on branding and marketing 
Milwaukee and pursuing what one researcher has dubbed the “job training charade,” 
rather than the kinds of meaningful regional “equity” polices in transportation, 
public finance and housing that could make a difference in combating minority 
joblessness. 
 
V. Policy Options: New Directions to Combat Black Male Joblessness 
in Milwaukee 
 
This study has identified three strategies that offer far greater likelihood of reducing black 
male joblessness in Milwaukee than current approaches: 
• Public infrastructure investment, which will not only meet pressing needs in a 
community with aging infrastructure, but could also play a critical role in boosting, 
Keynesian-style, local demand for low- to moderate-skilled labor. Particularly if 
accompanied by explicit minority-hiring goals or low-income resident preferential 
hiring programs, public investments could be a central element in a real Milwaukee 
“jobs strategy.” The examples of the Marquette Interchange project and the city of 
Milwaukee’s “Residents Preference Program” (RPP) show the promise of this 
“demand-side” approach to the labor market. 
In particular, this study recommends that Milwaukee leaders vigorously pursue 
development of a jobs-producing, competitiveness-enhancing regional light rail 
transit system. In its political resistance to light rail, Milwaukee is increasingly 
isolated among U.S. cities; and, the more Milwaukee remains immobilized on this 
issue, the more the region risks falling further behind our competitors economically, 
and the more we lose the opportunity for a “big bang” investment that could 
ameliorate the labor market for low- to moderate-skilled workers. 
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• The RPP and Marquette Interchange projects show that targeted hiring standards 
attached to local investments can improve the employment prospects for minorities 
and the disadvantaged. Milwaukee should follow the example of a growing number 
of cities around the country and attach “community benefits agreements” (CBAs) to 
major redevelopment projects, to give preferential hiring to inner city residents and 
minorities, and to require developers receiving public subsidies to meet job creation 
and wage standards. Moreover, all developers doing business in Milwaukee should 
be encouraged to meet these standards. 
• A critical element of a jobs strategy in Milwaukee must involve opening up the 
suburban labor markets of the region to racial diversity. “Opening up the suburbs” 
might include several policy options, but the two most important are transportation 
and housing. Regional transportation policies must be realigned to facilitate the 
access of central city workers to suburban employment centers; and building 
affordable housing in the suburbs is essential, so that low- to –moderate-skilled 
workers, with limited incomes, can live in greater proximity to the location of 90 
percent of the region’s entry-level job openings. 
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I. Introduction 
 
There is no greater economic challenge facing Milwaukee than the crisis of joblessness 
among black males in the city. Indeed, as we have documented in earlier reports, black males 
have increasingly faced a “stealth depression” in Milwaukee, with jobless rates exceeding 50 
percent by the early 2000s.1 In the past year, several studies have brought attention nationally to 
the crisis of  “black males left behind”2 in cities across the country, noting in particular the 
growing “disconnect” between young black males and the worlds of school and work.3
But while the problem of black male joblessness is national in scope and pervasive in urban 
America, the crisis is especially acute in Milwaukee. By the early 1990s, Milwaukee had already 
begun to register the highest rates of black male joblessness among all comparable-sized cities 
and metropolitan areas in the Northeast-Midwest “industrial belt,”4 a trend that continued 
through the early 2000s. Moreover, over the past two decades, the gap separating employment 
rates among white and black working age males in Milwaukee has consistently been the widest 
among these “Rustbelt” cities and regions.  
This report presents the most up-to-date analysis available of recent trends in black male 
joblessness in Milwaukee, examining racial disparities in the city and regional labor markets, and 
placing Milwaukee’s record in comparative and historical context. Our chief finding is that 
Milwaukee’s 30-year trend of near-linear growth in black male joblessness peaked in the city in 
2003 at 51.3 percent and declined by 2005 to 44.1 percent. In addition, by 2005, racial disparities 
had narrowed somewhat in the city and region, and Milwaukee’s black-white employment gap 
had moved closer to the average of other Northeast-Midwest cities and metropolitan areas. 
Nevertheless, the black male jobless rate remains unacceptably high in Milwaukee, with black 
male joblessness here ranking second highest among comparable Northeast-Midwest 
metropolitan areas in 2005. Civic leadership in Milwaukee, we contend, continues to lack the 
vision, policies, and institutions to comprehensively attack and meaningfully alleviate the crisis 
of race and jobs in the city and region. 
This report contains three main sections. First, we present the most current data on trends in 
black male joblessness and racial disparities in employment, for Milwaukee as well as a pool of 
“benchmark” cities and regions. Second, we analyze how the confluence of three key factors –
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suburbanization, hyper-segregation, and deindustrialization-- has shaped the particularly sharp 
racial disparities in the Milwaukee labor market. Finally, we examine the shortcomings of 
existing policies and strategies and identify some promising alternative policy options. Some 
observers have recently called for nothing less than a Milwaukee “Marshall Plan” to attack the 
city’s job crisis;5 in the conclusion of this report we sketch the broad outlines of what such a 
“Marshall Plan” might look like. 
 
II. Measuring Joblessness 
 
The level of joblessness in a labor market is most often conveyed in one universally 
recognized and widely reported number: the unemployment rate. This statistic measures the 
percentage of people over the age of 16 in an area’s civilian labor force, actively looking for 
work, who do not have a job.  
However, the official unemployment rate is an imperfect and sometimes misleading indicator 
of the true extent of joblessness. As calculated by the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 
the officially unemployed do not include working-age people who are not working but, for 
various reasons, are not in the labor force.  Some of these potential workers, such as most 
students and homemakers, as well as the voluntarily self-employed or voluntarily retired, have 
chosen not to be in the labor force; thus, it makes sense to exclude them from measures of 
unemployment.  
However, many other potential workers are not included in the official unemployment rate 
even though they are not necessarily among the voluntarily jobless.  Some are “discouraged 
workers,” who have given up looking for elusive employment. Others may simply not enter the 
labor market, convinced that appropriate jobs are not available. These individuals do not show up 
in the official unemployment statistics, although they are clearly part of the jobless population in 
a community. 
Thus, because the official unemployment rate ignores those who are not seeking jobs, it 
understates the full scope of joblessness. A different way, therefore, to gauge joblessness –and 
the one we will use in this report—is to look at the percentage of the total working age not 
employed: everyone between the ages of 16-64, not just those actively in the civilian labor force. 
Obviously, this “jobless rate” will never be zero: aside from “frictional unemployment” (people 
between jobs), there are always working-age full-time students, homemakers, early retirees, or 
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the self-employed who are voluntarily not in the labor force.6 But clearly, the more robust the 
labor market, the lower the jobless rate for the entire working-age population. Finally, to 
eliminate the effects of gender differences in labor market participation over time –as well as to 
focus on the particular crisis of black male joblessness—this study reports on trends, by race, in 
the rate of male joblessness in Milwaukee and other cities and regions.7  
 
III. Race and Male Joblessness in Milwaukee: 2005 
 
The most recent data on race and employment in cities and metropolitan areas comes from 
the American Community Survey (ACS), a relatively new annual nationwide survey, conducted 
by the U.S. Bureau of the Census since 2001. Care must be taken in using this data to analyze 
urban trends (see the Appendix to this report); among other issues, the ACS samples, when 
broken down by race and ethnicity, are small enough to contain a rather substantial margin of 
error. Although this error margin is not larger than the “statistical range” contained in the local 
“race and unemployment” data historically provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, it does 
mean that we should be cautious in interpreting changes from one year to the next or differences 
between cities or metro areas, all of which might merely reflect measurement “noise.” Context 
and longer time series are important in sorting out genuine trends as opposed to measurement 
variation. Notwithstanding these important caveats, the ACS nevertheless offers us the most up-
to-date statistics on race and employment in U.S. cities and metropolitan areas (as well as a host 
of other social, demographic, economic, and housing characteristics). 
As Table 1 reveals, the jobless rate for working-age black males in the four-county 
metropolitan Milwaukee region8 stood at 43.1 percent in 2005, a small decline from 46.5 percent 
in 2002 (the first year for which data is available for most cities and metropolitan areas in the 
ACS).9  White male joblessness increased slightly between 2002-2005 in metro Milwaukee and 
thus, combined with the decline in black male joblessness during this period, the region’s racial 
gap in joblessness shrank by almost five percentage points. Nevertheless, the region’s racial 
disparity in joblessness remains imposing: in 2005, the jobless rate for black males was more 
than double the white rate and, as we shall see, Milwaukee’s racial gap in joblessness remains 
among the widest in large Northeast-Midwest metropolitan areas.  
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Table 1:  
Male Joblessness in Metropolitan Milwaukee, 2002-2005 
 (percentage of working-age* males unemployed or not in the labor force) 
 
YEAR BLACK WHITE HISPANIC 
2002 46.5% 18.7% 25.6% 
2005 43.1% 20.1% 29.3% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2002, 2005  
*Working-age = between ages of 16-64 
 
Tables 2 and 3 provide more detail on male joblessness in metro Milwaukee in 2005, 
breaking down jobless rates by race, age, and place of residence. Three observations stand out. 
First, jobless rates are high in all age categories for black males in metro Milwaukee. Even in the 
prime working-age category --between the ages of 25 and 54 when retirement or schooling are 
not significant factors removing potential workers from the labor market-- one-third of 
Milwaukee’s black males are either unemployed or not in the labor market. In all other working-
age categories, the black male jobless rate was near 50 percent (and a staggering 76.3 percent for 
black male teenagers). 
Table 2: 
Metropolitan Milwaukee Male Jobless Rates: 2005 
By Race, Ethnicity, and Age 
 
AGE 
CATEGORY 
BLACK WHITE HISPANIC 
16-19 76.3% 52.6% 48.5% 
20-24 48.2% 21.1% 33.0% 
25-54 33.4% 13.4% 24.5% 
55-64 49.1% 29.6% 44.0% 
All Working-Age 43.1% 20.1% 29.3% 
Source: Same as Table 1 
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Table 3: 
City-Suburb Disparities in Male Jobless Rates in Metropolitan Milwaukee: 2005 
By Race, Ethnicity, Age, and Place of Residence 
 
AGE BLACK 
CITY  
BLACK 
SUBURBS
WHITE 
CITY 
WHITE 
SUBURBS
HISPANIC 
CITY 
HISPANIC 
SUBURBS 
16-19 76.6% 52.4% 53.8% 52.4% 54.9% 36.0% 
20-24 50.4% 33.2% 32.8% 17.4% 34.7% 33.0% 
25-54 34.6% 28.3% 18.7% 11.8% 21.1% 27.9% 
55-64 51.9% 22.2% 43.3% 26.3% 46.8% 40.1% 
All 
16-64 
44.1% 28.6% 25.5% 18.3% 27.6% 25.3% 
Source: Same as Table 1 
 
Second, a huge racial gap in male joblessness exists in all age categories in metro 
Milwaukee, from teenage workers to prime working-age adults. Black male joblessness not only 
exceeds the white rate by at least 20 percentage points in all age groupings, but the jobless rate 
among black males also is significantly higher than for Hispanic males in metro Milwaukee, 
particularly among younger workers. 
 
Table 4: 
Racial Segmentation in the Metropolitan Milwaukee Labor Market 
The Percentage of Region’s Working-Age Males, By Age Category, 
Living In the City of Milwaukee: 2005 
 
AGE 
CATEGORY 
BLACK WHITE HISPANIC 
 
16-19 98.7% 15.4% 66.2% 
20-24 95.6% 25.3% 67.0% 
25-54 89.6% 23.0% 69.2% 
55-64 93.4% 23.0% 57.6% 
All Working-
Age 
92.0% 21.9% 67.8% 
Source: Same as Table 1 
 
Finally, as Table 3 shows, for both black and white males in metro Milwaukee, there is a 
substantial disparity between the jobless rates in the city of Milwaukee as opposed to the 
suburbs. Among prime working-age white males, for example, the jobless rate in the city is 
almost 60 percent higher than it is in the suburbs. However, since the vast majority (78 percent) 
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of working-age white males in the region live in the suburbs, the impact of this city-suburban 
disparity on overall rates of metropolitan area white male joblessness is mitigated. On the other 
hand, this city-suburban disparity overlaps with the racial segregation of metro Milwaukee’s 
labor market: over 90 percent of the region’s black male workers live in the city of Milwaukee 
(Table 4) where, as we will examine later, there has been no net job growth since the late 1970s. 
Consequently, as Table 3 clearly shows, today there is a sharp racial polarization of the region’s 
male labor market, with the largest gaps in jobless rates separating white suburbanites from black 
residents of the central city. For example, among prime working-age males (25-54), the jobless 
rate for white suburbanites in 2005 was 11.8 percent, compared to 34.6 percent black males 
living in the city of Milwaukee. We shall return in detail later in this study to the devastating 
consequences of suburbanization and segregation in shaping the crisis of joblessness among 
Milwaukee’s working-age black males.   
 
IV. Race and Joblessness in Milwaukee: A Comparative Perspective, 
2002-2005  
 
The crisis of black male joblessness pervades urban America. But, as the following tables 
make clear, the employment situation for black males in Milwaukee, despite modest 
improvements between 2002-2005, remains near the bleakest among the largest cities and 
metropolitan areas in the Northeast and Midwest. We have compared race and male joblessness 
in Milwaukee to other “benchmark” cities and regions along the following dimensions:  
joblessness for all working-age black males (ages 16-64); joblessness for prime working-age 
black males (ages 25-54); and the disparity in jobless rates between black and white males.  
As Tables 5-8 illustrate, the rate of black male joblessness in the Milwaukee region remains 
near the highest of Northeast-Midwest metropolitan areas, and in 2005 the racial gap in male 
joblessness was, with the exception of metro Pittsburgh, the widest among “Frostbelt” 
metropolitan areas. On all our indicators of black male joblessness or racial disparity, metro  
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Milwaukee’s rate –in both 2002 and 2005—was substantially above the Frostbelt average. On 
the other hand, between 2002-2005 about half of the Frostbelt metropolitan areas, including 
Milwaukee, experienced declines in the black male jobless rate and shrinking racial disparities 
(Tables 5 and 7). However, although any decline in metro Milwaukee’s rate of black male 
joblessness is encouraging, the black employment gains since 2002 have been quite modest and 
metro Milwaukee’s black male jobless rate remains high by comparative and historical 
standards.10
 
Table 5: 
Black Male Jobless Rates in Selected Metropolitan Areas: 2002-2005 
Percentage of working-age (16-64) black males either 
unemployed or out of the labor force 
 
2002 2005 
Baltimore             N/A Boston                  28.3% 
Minneapolis         N/A Baltimore             31.6% 
Cincinnati             N/A Indianapolis          34.4% 
Indianapolis          30.8% Kansas City          34.9% 
Pittsburgh             31.9% Minneapolis        35.9% 
Cleveland             32.3% Cincinnati             36.3% 
Boston                  36.4% Philadelphia         39.7% 
Detroit                  39.0% St. Louis               40.1% 
Kansas City          39.1% Buffalo                 40.4% 
Philadelphia         39.7% Chicago                42.1% 
Chicago                41.1% Detroit                  42.7% 
St. Louis               42.8% Cleveland             42.7% 
Buffalo                 45.7% Milwaukee           43.1% 
Milwaukee           46.5% Pittsburgh             48.3% 
Average               38.7% Average               39.1% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2002 and 2005. 
 
UWM Center for Economic Development 
 
21
Table 6: 
 
Jobless Rates for Prime Working-Age Black Males in Metropolitan Areas:  
2002-2005 
Percentage of prime working-age (25-54) black males either 
unemployed or out of the labor force 
 
2002 2005 
Baltimore         N/A Boston              19.7% 
Minneapolis     N/A Baltimore 21.5% 
Cincinnati         N/A Indianapolis     22.8% 
Indianapolis      21.0% Kansas City      25.2% 
Cleveland     21.1%  Minneapolis     25.8% 
Boston              23.0% Cincinnati         26.4% 
Pittsburgh         24.0% Philadelphia     29.2% 
Kansas City      28.3% St. Louis           30.6% 
Detroit              31.2% Chicago            31.6% 
Philadelphia     31.4% Detroit              32.0% 
Buffalo             32.0% Cleveland         33.2% 
Chicago            33.0% Buffalo             33.7% 
Milwaukee       33.5% Milwaukee       33.9% 
St. Louis           34.2% Pittsburgh         37.3% 
Average           28.4% Average           28.8% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2002 and 2005. 
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Table 7: 
 
Racial Disparity in Jobless Rates Among Working-Age Males 
in Selected Metropolitan Areas: 2002-2005 
Percentage difference by which the jobless rate for black 
working-age males (16-64) exceeded white rate 
 
2002 2005 
Baltimore          N/A Boston               8.9 
Minneapolis      N/A Baltimore          13.6 
Cincinnati         N/A Cincinnati         15.0 
Cleveland          8.7 Buffalo              15.2 
Pittsburgh          10.3 Indianapolis      15.5 
Indianapolis      12.4 Kansas City       16.5 
Detroit               15.0 Minneapolis      19.2 
Boston               16.1 Philadelphia      19.2 
Philadelphia      19.7 Detroit               19.9 
Kansas City       19.9 St. Louis            20.1 
Chicago             20.8 Cleveland          21.8 
St. Louis            21.9 Chicago             22.7 
Buffalo              22.7 Milwaukee        23.0 
Milwaukee        27.8 Pittsburgh          24.2 
Average            17.8 Average            18.2 
      Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2002 and 2005. 
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Table 8: 
 
Racial Disparity in Jobless Rates Among Prime Working-Age Males 
in Selected Metropolitan Areas: 2002-2005 
Percentage difference by which the jobless rate for black 
prime working-age males (25-54) exceeded white rate 
 
2002 2005 
Baltimore          N/A Boston             7.5 
Minneapolis      N/A Indianapolis     10.7 
Cincinnati          N/A Baltimore         11.0 
Cleveland          5.7 Cincinnati        13.1 
Boston               8.7 Kansas City     13.7 
Pittsburgh          10.5 Philadelphia     15.6 
Indianapolis       10.8 Minneapolis     16.0 
Detroit               13.9 Buffalo             16.4 
Kansas City       16.5 St. Louis          17.1 
Buffalo              17.3 Detroit             17.2 
Philadelphia      17.9 Cleveland         20.0 
St. Louis            19.2 Milwaukee       20.2 
Chicago             20.0 Chicago           20.3 
Milwaukee        21.7 Pittsburgh        21.4 
Average            14.7 Average           15.7 
      Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2002 and 2005. 
 
The story between 2002 and 2005 is slightly different when we look at male jobless rates in 
cities (Tables 9-12) as opposed to metropolitan areas. The black male jobless rate in the city of 
Milwaukee declined slightly between 2002-2005, from 48.4 percent to 44.4 percent, while white 
male joblessness in the city increased (from 20.6 percent to 25.5 percent); as a result, the racial 
disparity in male joblessness in the city shrank markedly between 2002-2005 (see Table 11).11   
At the same time, as black male joblessness was declining in Milwaukee between 2002-
2005, it rose in 9 of the 14 Northeast-Midwest big cities against which we have “benchmarked” 
Milwaukee. Thus, the city’s relative ranking improved:  in 2002, Milwaukee had the 14th highest 
rate of black male joblessness of the 15 large Frostbelt cities; in 2005, Milwaukee ranked 7th, 
right in the middle of the pack and around the Frostbelt average.  In 2002, Milwaukee had the 
widest racial disparity in male jobless rates of this pool of Northeast-Midwest big cities; in 2005, 
Milwaukee had the 10th widest racial disparity among the 15 cities.12
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The city-to-city comparisons, however, are somewhat misleading, because in metro 
Milwaukee, unlike elsewhere in the Frostbelt, there has been virtually no suburbanization of the 
working-age black male population. As Table 13 shows, 92 percent of metro Milwaukee’s 
working-age black males live in the city of Milwaukee, a substantially higher proportion than the 
Frostbelt average of 51.1 percent of metro area working-age black males living in central cities. 
Thus, when we examine black male employment in cities, we’re effectively comparing virtually 
Milwaukee’s entire metro area black male workforce to the half of the black male workforce 
living in the central city in other metropolitan areas; the “half,” we should underscore, who are 
generally among the region’s least-advantaged population. This is why the black male jobless 
situation in Milwaukee, although hardly roseate, looks marginally better in city-to-city 
comparisons than in comparisons at the metropolitan area level. For example, when we look at 
just the central city, in 2005 the black male jobless rate in Milwaukee was actually 1.8 
percentage points lower than in Minneapolis; however, when we compare the two metropolitan 
areas, the black male jobless rate in Milwaukee was 7.2 points higher than in Minneapolis. This 
is because in Minneapolis unlike Milwaukee, the majority of the region’s working-age black 
males live in suburbs, where job growth is more rapid than in the city and where black male 
jobless rates are much lower.13 Indeed, as we shall examine shortly, Milwaukee’s low rate of 
black suburbanization is a critical factor explaining the severity of the crisis of black male 
joblessness here compared to other Frostbelt regions.14  
Thus, when comparing the employment situation of black males in Milwaukee to elsewhere 
in the Frostbelt, the more meaningful comparisons are at the metropolitan area level. However, 
the bottom line is that no matter whether we look at the city or metro Milwaukee as a whole, the 
crisis of black male joblessness remains stark and persistent here. Notwithstanding indications of 
modest improvement between 2002 and 2005, the jobless rate for black males in the city remains 
high at 44.1 percent, and, as a region, Milwaukee still registers among the highest black male 
jobless rates in the Frostbelt. In the next section of this study, we explore the structural and 
historical factors that underpin the crisis of black male joblessness in Milwaukee.  
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Table 9: 
Black Male Jobless Rates in Selected Cities: 2002-2005 
Percentage of working-age (16-64) black males either 
unemployed or out of the labor force 
 
2002 2005 
Minneapolis        31.4% Boston                33.6% 
Indianapolis        31.5% Kansas City        35.4% 
Columbus           35.5% Indianapolis       37.1% 
Cleveland           36.5% Columbus           37.4% 
Pittsburgh           38.5% Cincinnati           39.0% 
Baltimore            39.4% Baltimore            39.8% 
Kansas City        40.7% Milwaukee          44.4% 
Detroit                41.2% Buffalo               45.4% 
Boston                41.3% Philadelphia        45.9% 
Cincinnati           44.1% Minneapolis        46.2% 
Philadelphia        44.7% Chicago              48.3% 
Buffalo               46.9% Detroit                48.9% 
Chicago              47.7% St. Louis             49.2% 
Milwaukee          48.2% Cleveland           49.6% 
St. Louis             50.1% Pittsburgh           55.9% 
Average             41.2% Average               43.7% 
        Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2002 and 2005 
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Table 10: 
 
Jobless Rates for Prime Working-Age Black Males 
in Selected Cities: 2002-2005 
Percentage of prime working-age (25-54) black males either 
unemployed or out of the labor force 
 
2002 2005 
Indianapolis     22.2% Boston             24.9% 
Cleveland        25.7% Indianapolis     24.9% 
Columbus        26.6% Cincinnati        28.6% 
Boston             26.6% Kansas City     26.4% 
Minneapolis     27.1% Columbus        28.7% 
Cincinnati        28.1% Baltimore         31.3% 
Baltimore         28.9% Minneapolis     32.6% 
Kansas City     33.5% Philadelphia     33.3% 
Buffalo            33.7% Milwaukee       34.6% 
Milwaukee       34.2% Buffalo             36.5% 
Detroit             34.6% Chicago           37.7% 
Pittsburgh        36.1% Detroit             37.9% 
Philadelphia     39.4% St. Louis          40.1% 
Chicago           41.3% Cleveland         41.3% 
St. Louis          46.7% Pittsburgh        49.0% 
Average          32.3% Average           33.9% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2002 and 2005 
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Table 11: 
 
Racial Disparity in Jobless Rates Among Working-Age Males 
in Selected Cities: 2002-2005 
Percentage difference by which the jobless rate for black 
working-age males (16-64) exceeded white rate 
 
2002 2005 
Detroit                 (-3.2) Detroit                 7.4 
Cleveland            6.0 Boston                 10.2 
Columbus            14.9 Columbus            13.7 
Pittsburgh            15.1 Buffalo                15.4 
Indianapolis         15.6 Indianapolis         15.6 
Minneapolis         16.0 Kansas City         16.0 
Boston                 16.2 Cincinnati            16.6 
Philadelphia         16.5 Baltimore             18.4 
Cincinnati            16.5 Philadelphia         16.9 
Baltimore             16.6 Milwaukee           18.9 
Kansas City         21.6 Cleveland            19.4 
Buffalo                23.8 St. Louis              24.6 
Chicago               25.6 Minneapolis         27.3 
St. Louis              25.9 Chicago               29.6 
Milwaukee           27.8 Pittsburgh            30.8 
Average              17.0 Average              18.7 
      Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2002 and 2005. 
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Table 12: 
 
Racial Disparity in Jobless Rates Among Prime Working-Age Males 
in Selected Cities: 2002-2005 
Percentage difference by which the jobless rate for black 
prime working-age males (25-54) exceeded white rate 
 
2002 2005 
Detroit                 (-7.2) Detroit                 4.0 
Cleveland            1.8 Boston                 6.5 
Boston                 9.6 Indianapolis         8.6 
Cincinnati            10.1 Cincinnati            10.8 
Baltimore             11.3 Columbus            10.9 
Columbus            11.7 Buffalo                12.4 
Indianapolis         11.7 Philadelphia         12.4 
Buffalo                14.3 Kansas City         13.6 
Kansas City         16.6 Baltimore             15.6 
Minneapolis         16.7 Milwaukee           15.9 
Pittsburgh            17.1 Cleveland            17.3 
Philadelphia         18.4 Minneapolis         19.0 
Milwaukee           18.6 St. Louis             21.6 
Chicago               24.3 Chicago               25.6 
St. Louis              33.3 Pittsburgh           32.9 
Average              13.9 Average              15.1 
      Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2002 and 2005. 
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Table 13: 
 
Percentage of Metropolitan Area Working-Age Males Living 
In Central City, By Race, in Selected Regions: 2005 
 
METRO AREA BLACK WHITE RACIAL 
DISPARITY 
Milwaukee 92.0% 21.9% 70.1
Detroit 65.8% 2.7% 63.1
Buffalo 76.1% 13.5% 62.6
Cincinnati 52.1% 8.7% 43.4
Cleveland 52.9% 10.1% 42.8
Baltimore 52.0% 11.0% 41.0
Philadelphia 52.9% 13.9% 39.0
Kansas City 56.0% 18.1% 37.9
Chicago 53.7% 17.2% 36.5
Pittsburgh 45.2% 9.9% 35.3
Boston 43.0% 8.9% 34.1
St. Louis 32.9% 7.4% 25.5
Minneapolis 30.6% 10.3% 20.3
Average –All 
Metro Areas 
51.1% 11.8% 39.3
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2005. 
 
V. Black Male Joblessness in Milwaukee, 1970-2005:  
Historical Development and Explanatory Factors 
 
The crisis of black male joblessness in Milwaukee has been in the making for over three 
decades and has coincided with profound changes in the racial composition of the city’s labor 
force and the geographic distribution of metropolitan Milwaukee’s working-age population. 
Since 1970, the number of working-age black males in Milwaukee has more than doubled (from 
25,267 to 57,916) while the number of working-age white males in the city has fallen by more 
than 55 percent (from 174,350 to 77,751). In 1970, whites constituted 85.6 percent of 
Milwaukee’s male working-age population; by 2005, as a result of three decades of white flight 
combined with the growth of black and Hispanic populations, the working-age male population 
in the city of Milwaukee had become majority-minority.    
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Table 14: 
Racial Change in the City of Milwaukee Male Labor Market: 1970-2005 
 (racial composition of working-age male population) 
 
YEAR BLACK WHITE  HISPANIC % WHITE 
1970 25,267 174,350 4,129 85.6% 
1980 38,124 154,564 7,627 77.2% 
1990 48,464 123,077 11,254 67.3% 
2000 55,216 92,489 23,969 53.9% 
2005 57,916 77,751 26,319 48.0% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: Characteristics of the Population, Wisconsin (1970-
2000); U.S. Bureau the Census, American Community Survey, 2005. 
 
In addition to the changing racial composition of the city’s workforce, Milwaukee also 
witnessed between 1970 and 2005 the emergence of the Frostbelt’s most racially segmented 
regional labor market (with the possible exception of Detroit). White flight from the city 
(especially after 1980), the settlement in the suburbs of the vast majority of white in-migrants to 
the region, and Milwaukee’s extraordinarily low rate of black suburbanization all combined to 
produce a distinct and growing geographic-racial divide in the metropolitan area’s male 
workforce. As Table 15 shows, in 1970 nearly one-half of metro Milwaukee’s working-age 
white male population lived in the city of Milwaukee; by 2005, the city share had fallen to barely 
more than a fifth. Conversely, as we have already discussed, virtually all of metro Milwaukee’s 
working-age black male population lives in the city of Milwaukee, a concentration that has 
barely attenuated since 1970. Although the region’s Hispanic male workers are less concentrated 
in the city than is the black workforce, the vast majority of working-age Hispanic males in metro 
Milwaukee also reside in the city. In racial terms, then, metro Milwaukee has evolved since 1970 
into two, highly segmented labor markets: one in suburbia, which is almost exclusively white; 
the other, in the city, with a rapidly shrinking number of white workers and where “minorities” 
now constitute a majority of the working-age male residents.  As we will examine shortly, this 
segmentation –an element of Milwaukee’s hyper-segregated residential patterns—plays a critical 
role in shaping Milwaukee’s pattern of black male joblessness. 
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Table 15: 
Percentage of Metropolitan Milwaukee’s Working-Age Males 
Living in the City of Milwaukee, By Race: 1970-2005 
 
 
YEAR BLACK WHITE HISPANIC 
1970 97.7% 47.5% 71.7% 
1980 96.4% 37.3% 74.4% 
1990 95.5% 33.1% 77.0% 
2000 91.8% 25.4% 76.3% 
2005 92.0% 21.9% 67.8% 
Source: Same as Table 14 
 
It has been in this context of racial change that the crisis of black male joblessness has 
unfolded in Milwaukee since 1970. The rise in black male joblessness in Milwaukee during the 
past 35 years has been relentless, increasing substantially at each census measurement until 
reaching a staggering 51.5 percent in 2003 (before improving to 44.1 percent by 2005).  
Although black joblessness climbed sharply in Milwaukee during the 1970s, the real turning 
point came during the brutal 1982 recession when the city hemorrhaged thousands of 
manufacturing jobs15 and, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the rate of black male 
joblessness first passed 50 percent in the city.16 Ever since then, Milwaukee’s black male jobless 
rate has never dipped below 40 percent. White male joblessness has also climbed in Milwaukee 
since the 1970s –a reflection of the general economic stagnation of the city over the past 30 
years—but at a much slower rate than black male joblessness.  
Consequently, Milwaukee’s racial gap in male joblessness, while not insignificant in 1970, 
grew to giant proportions as early as 1980. As Table 16 shows, ever since 1980 black male 
joblessness in Milwaukee has exceeded joblessness among white males living in the suburbs by 
between 26 and 33 percentage points.  Even in the city itself, the racial gap in joblessness 
widened considerably over the past 30 years, from 10 points in 1970, to 29 points in 2004, before 
falling back to 20 points according to the 2005 census figures. 
Perhaps even more striking has been the growth in joblessness among prime working-age 
black males in Milwaukee since 1970. As noted earlier, joblessness among males between the 
ages of 25-54 is particularly revealing of the state of the local labor market; we’re much less 
likely to see, in this age group, potential workers voluntarily absent from the labor market 
because of schooling, retirement, or homemaking. In a percolating, full employment economy,  
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Table 16 
Jobless Rates for Working-Age Males in Milwaukee: 1970-2005 
% of working-age males unemployed or not in the 
labor force, by race, ethnicity, and place of residence 
 
YEAR BLACK-
CITY 
WHITE-
CITY 
WHITE-
SUBURBS 
HISPANIC 
CITY 
1970 26.3 16.0 13.1 19.6 
1980 38.4 22.3 12.3 29.1 
1990 43.5 20.4 12.3 32.2 
2000 47.3 21.4 14.2 37.3 
2002 48.2 20.4 18.1 30.2 
2003 51.5 24.7 20.4    20.317
2004 49.8 20.7 17.4 26.1 
2005 44.1 25.5 18.3 27.4 
Source: Same as Table 14 
 
we would expect to find very low rates of joblessness among prime working-age males; 
effectively, in a healthy labor market, joblessness among these males would be frictional 
unemployment (a relatively small number of workers, jobless for a short period – the proverbial 
“workers between jobs”). 
The jobless rate for prime working-age black males was 15.2 percent in 1970, relatively 
modest by historical standards, albeit double the rate for white city residents and almost 
quadruple the rate for suburbanites.18 However, as was the case when we considered all 
working-age black males, joblessness among prime-working age black males has grown 
ceaselessly in Milwaukee since 1970, peaking at an astonishing 40.8 percent in 2003, before 
improving to 34.6 percent by 2005. Consider, for a moment, what this signified: in 2003, four 
out of every 10 black males in Milwaukee, in their prime working years, were either unemployed 
or not even in the labor force seeking employment.  
Concomitantly, Milwaukee’s racial gap in joblessness among prime working-age males has 
widened consistently and considerably over the past 30 years. In 1970, as Table 17 shows, black 
male joblessness in Milwaukee exceeded joblessness among white males living in the suburbs by 
11 percentage points. By 1980, that gap had enlarged to 20 percentage points, and it has 
oscillated between 22 and 31 percentage points ever since.  
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Table 17 
Jobless Rates for Prime Working-Age Males in Milwaukee: 1970-2005 
% of working-age males unemployed or not in the 
labor force, by race, ethnicity, and place of residence 
 
YEAR BLACK-
CITY 
WHITE-
CITY 
WHITE-
SUBURBS 
HISPANIC 
CITY 
1970 15.2 7.4 4.1 9.8 
1980 24.5 9.8 3.9 9.6 
1990 34.6 12.2 8.8 24.9 
2000 38.7 16.2 8.4 32.8 
2002 34.2 15.6 10.4 27.0 
2003 40.8 17.9 9.6    14.319
2004 34.5 17.9 10.4 22.5 
2005 34.6 18.7 11.8 21.2 
Source: Same as Table 14 
 
Even if we limit the comparison to black and white prime working-age males living in the 
city of Milwaukee, the racial gap in joblessness has widened considerably over the past 30 years, 
from 8 points in 1970, to 22 points in 2004, before falling back to 16 points according to the 
2005 census figures.  
How did Milwaukee reach this disastrous state of affairs? What factors transformed 
Milwaukee from a city that in 1970 boasted the lowest jobless rates for black males in the 
Frostbelt, to a city that today struggles with black male jobless rates above 40 percent and racial 
disparities in employment that are among the widest in the Frostbelt? Understanding why black 
male joblessness has become so pervasive and entrenched in Milwaukee is an essential step to 
identifying promising policies to alleviate the situation. 
Three key factors present in all Frostbelt metropolises –deindustrialization, suburbanization, 
and racial segregation—have come together in a particularly virulent combination in Milwaukee 
to produce one of urban America’s most acute crises of black male joblessness. First, as is now 
well established, deindustrialization has been a fundamental element in Milwaukee’s general 
economic decline since the 1970s, and it has been especially devastating for working-age black 
males in the city. In 1970, 55.4 percent of Milwaukee’s black male workers were employed in 
manufacturing, compared to 42.2 percent of the city’s white male workers; thus, when 
Milwaukee began shedding factory jobs in the 1970s, black workers were more “at risk.”20 As 
we have previously argued: “[W]ith a disproportionate segment of its labor force employed in 
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manufacturing, black Milwaukee experienced disproportionate economic distress while the city 
deindustrialized in the 1970s and 1980s.”21 Moreover, this racial disparity in manufacturing 
employment was greater in Milwaukee than in any other Frostbelt city in 1970, which helps 
explain how, when deindustrialization hit, Milwaukee fell from having among the lowest rates of 
black male joblessness in the Frostbelt in 1970 to among the highest by 1990 and thereafter.  As 
Table 18 shows, the number of black males employed in manufacturing declined by almost 3,000 
between 1970-2000 (even as Milwaukee’s working-age black male population was growing by 
almost 30,000 during this period). Manufacturing was a critical source of jobs for Milwaukee’s 
black males through the 1970s, and, to a greater degree than anywhere else in the Frostbelt, 
industrial decline fundamentally diminished black male employment opportunities in the city.22 
 
Table 18: 
Race and Manufacturing Employment in Milwaukee: 1970-2000 
 (number of males employed in manufacturing, 
by race and place of residence) 
 
Black   White   Hispanic 
PLACE 1970 2000 1970 2000 1970 2000 
City 10,970 7,527 70,112 17,583 1,764 5,631 
Suburbs 93 629 69,725 70,496 756 2,103 
Metro 
Milwaukee 
11,063 8,156 139,837 88,079 2,420 7,734 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: Characteristics of the Population, Wisconsin, 1970; 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Factfinder, Census 2000 (Table PCT 85) 
 
Second, although Milwaukee’s deindustrialization is often carelessly and simplistically 
attributed to the challenges of “globalization,” it has been the suburbanization of jobs in metro 
Milwaukee –including manufacturing-- that has contributed mightily to the region’s crisis of 
black male joblessness. Contrary to the image of a deindustrializing region, the number of males 
employed in manufacturing and living in Milwaukee’s suburbs, regardless of race or ethnicity, 
has actually increased since 1970; but, of course, the overwhelming majority (96.3 percent) of 
these suburban-based manufacturing workers are white.  In fact, as Table 19 shows, the number 
of manufacturing jobs located in Milwaukee’s “exurban” suburbs of Ozaukee, Washington, and 
Waukesha Counties has tripled since the early 1960s.23  On the other hand, the city of 
Milwaukee –where, as we have seen, over 90 percent of the region’s black male working-age 
population lives—has lost over 70 percent of its manufacturing jobs since the 1960s. By 2002, in 
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fact, there were twice as many manufacturing jobs in the exurban counties of metro Milwaukee 
than in the city, the putative industrial center of the region. 
The suburbanization of manufacturing, of course, reflects the larger decentralization of the 
Milwaukee region’s overall employment base that has been underway for over 30 years. Since 
1980, all of the net job growth in metro Milwaukee has been in the suburbs, with the largest 
increases in the exurban counties (see Table 20). The city of Milwaukee has lost almost 18 
percent of its job base since 1980. Although the job location data presented here run only 
through 2002, data on the employment of residents suggests that economic decentralization 
continues unchecked in the Milwaukee region. According to the federal Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, metro Milwaukee as a whole has experienced employment decline since 2000, but it 
has been in the city of Milwaukee where the decline in the number of employed residents has 
been the greatest (7.2 percent between 2000-2005). Despite boosterish talk of a Milwaukee 
“renaissance” in recent years, the hollowing out of the city’s employment base has continued 
unabated. 
 
Table 19 
The Suburbanization of Manufacturing in Metro Milwaukee: 1963-2002 
Number of manufacturing jobs located in various jurisdictions 
 
YEAR CITY OF 
MILWAUKEE 
MILWAUKEE 
COUNTY 
SUBURBS 
EXURBAN 
COUNTIES* 
% OF REGION 
INDUSTRIAL 
JOBS IN CITY 
1963 119,284 56,051 24,858 59.6%
1967 118,600 62,500 35,400 54.8%
1977 91,400 62,200 50,500 44.8%
1982 77,900 51,400 51,100 43.2%
1987 63,900 43,100 57,000 40.0%
1997 46,467 40,466 78,210 28.1%
2002 34,957 32,654 71,386 25.1%
% change, 
1963-2002 
-70.7% -41.7% +187.1%
% change 
1982-2002 
-55.1% -36.5% +39.7%
*Ozaukee, Washington, and Waukesha Counties 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book (various years);  
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Economic Census: Geographic Area Series (various years). 
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Table 20: 
Where Milwaukeeans Work: The Decentralization of Jobs in 
 Metropolitan Milwaukee, 1980-2000 
Number of jobs located in various jurisdictions 
 
YEAR CITY OF 
MILWAUKEE 
MILWAUKEE 
COUNTY 
SUBURBS 
EXURBAN 
COUNTIES 
% OF 
REGION’S  
JOBS IN 
CITY 
1980 331,982 161,282 165,966 50.2% 
1990 314,960 168,634 227,457 44.3% 
2000 285,260 178,654 296,676 37.5% 
2002 273,014 185,380 301,321 35.9% 
% change 
1980-
2002 
-17.8% +14.9% +81.6%  
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Journey To Work (1980, 1990, 2000); U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, State of the Cities Data System: County Business Patterns Special Extract (2002); U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns (2002) 
 
Table 21: 
Where Workers Live: Employed Residents in Metro Milwaukee, 2000-2005 
Number of employed working-age residents, by place of residence 
 
YEAR CITY OF 
MILWAUKEE 
MILW. CO. 
SUBURBS 
EXURBAN COS. 
 
2000 268,473 189,617 320,352 
2001 262,951 187,676 319,294 
2002 255,879 183,287 315,810 
2003 252,032 180,987 316,858 
2004 249,622 180,888 318,386 
2005 249,095 180,506 317,715 
% change  
2000-2005 
-7.2% -4.8% -0.8% 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics (2000-2005). 
Annual employment averages. 
 
Finally, the suburbanization of jobs in metropolitan Milwaukee, especially in 
manufacturing, has combined with the region’s entrenched residential segregation to produce a 
“spatial mismatch” in the regional labor market. This mismatch has severely limited employment 
possibilities for the region’s black males. To put it bluntly: the overwhelming majority of the 
region’s working-age black males live in a city with an eroding employment base, while all of 
the net job growth in the region is occurring in exurban areas where few blacks live and to which 
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city-based minority workers have minimal transportation access.24 Table 22 shows the degree to 
which the suburban labor market is terra incognita for black workers in Milwaukee.25 Through 
2000, just over 8,500 black workers in metropolitan Milwaukee –only 11 percent of all black 
workers in the region—had secured employment in the exurban counties, representing a tiny 
fraction of the exurban workforce. By contrast, 43.1 percent of the region’s white workers were 
employed in the exurban counties in 2000.  This racial disparity is equally apparent when we 
take into account all suburban employment (i.e. the exurban counties and the Milwaukee County 
suburbs). While 29.7 percent of metro Milwaukee’s black workers were employed in the suburbs 
in 2000, 67.1 percent of the region’s white workforce held a job in suburbia.  These data run 
through 2000, but given the stagnant job growth throughout the regional labor market over the 
past five years, there is no reason to believe that Milwaukee’s spatial mismatch has improved 
since then.26  
Table 22: 
Where Do Blacks Hold Jobs in Metro Milwaukee? 
  
LOCATION 
 
TOTAL 
WORKFORCE 
BLACK 
WORKFORCE 
BLACK % 
OF TOTAL 
City of Milwaukee  
(excluding downtown) 
222,674 41,432 18.6%
Downtown Milwaukee 62,645 8,345 13.3%
Milwaukee County Suburbs 178,605 14,649 8.2%
Waukesha County 208,470 6,553 3.1%
Washington County 48,400 1,250 3.2%
Ozaukee County 39,130 1,250 2.7%
Metro Milwaukee (total) 760,014 72,960 9.6%
Source: CED analysis of U.S. Census Transportation Planning Package (CTPP) data on 
place of work, based on 2000 census. 
 
Although all of metro Milwaukee’s net job growth has occurred in exurbia in recent years, 
downtown Milwaukee has been one of the few bright spots in an otherwise dismal city labor 
market since the early 1990s. Downtown Milwaukee gained 3,442 jobs between 1994 and 2004, 
according to the U.S. Census Bureau.27 However, as Table 22 shows, blacks made up only 13.3 
percent of the downtown workforce, according to the 2000 census. What’s more, over three-
fifths (61.2 percent) of these workers earned under $25,000 a year.28 In short, not only has job 
growth in downtown Milwaukee provided few employment opportunities for black workers, but, 
in addition, the bulk of downtown jobs secured by blacks do not pay a family-supporting wage.29
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In sum, a convergence of trends --deindustrialization, suburbanization, and racial 
segregation-- has systematically diminished the employment prospects for black males in 
Milwaukee since the 1970s. These developments are common, of course, to all Frostbelt 
metropolises; but, Milwaukee’s uniquely low rate of black suburbanization, combined with a 
historically high reliance of Milwaukee’s black male workers on now-vanishing manufacturing 
jobs, has produced a particularly acute employment crisis for black males in the city. 
Milwaukee’s especially pronounced mismatch between the geography of race and the geography 
of job growth has helped generate persistent, high rates of black male joblessness in the region.  
Two other factors –intra- and inter-regional disparities in educational attainment as well as 
the age structure of Milwaukee’s black male community-- also help explain both racial 
differences in male joblessness in Milwaukee, as well as why the employment picture for black 
males is especially dismal here compared to other cities and regions. First, as is well established, 
educational attainment is a critical variable shaping employment prospects in increasingly post-
industrial, knowledge-based economies. There is a substantial racial gap in male educational 
attainment in Milwaukee; in the metropolitan area, for example, white males are almost three 
times as likely as black males to hold college, professional, or advanced degrees, a disparity that 
mirrors the racial disparity in male joblessness. 
 
Table 23: 
Milwaukee’s Racial Gap in Educational Attainment 
% of males, 25 and older, with high school, 
college or advanced degrees, by race                   
 
 % High School grad      
(includes some college)    
% college, professional/ 
or advanced degree 
PLACE BLACK WHITE BLACK WHITE 
 
City of Milwaukee 58.9% 58.9% 8.4% 18.5%
Metropolitan Milwaukee 58.1% 57.4% 9.9% 28.5%
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Factfinder, Census 2000 Summary File 4  
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The elevated rate of black male joblessness in Milwaukee compared to other Frostbelt 
cities and regions also appears to be attributable, to some extent, to inter-regional disparities in 
educational attainment among black males. High school graduation rates among black males are 
similar in Milwaukee and other Frostbelt cities and regions. However, Milwaukee lags 
considerably behind most other Frostbelt metropolises in the percentage of black males holding 
college, professional, or advanced degrees (see Tables 24 and 25).  
 
Table 24: 
Comparative Educational Attainment of  
Black Males In Frostbelt Cities 
% of black males, 25 and older, with high school,  
college or advanced degrees 
 
CITY % HIGH 
SCHOOL 
GRADUATE* 
 
% COLLEGE, 
PROFESSIONAL, 
OR ADVANCED 
DEGREE 
Baltimore 54.4% 8.7% 
Boston 56.2% 16.0% 
Buffalo 60.8% 9.1% 
Cincinnati 57.3% 9.9% 
Chicago 56.6% 12.2% 
Cleveland 59.2% 5.5% 
Columbus 62.6% 14.5% 
Detroit 60.0% 8.2% 
Indianapolis 61.4% 13.3% 
Kansas City 61.7% 10.7% 
Milwaukee 58.9% 8.4% 
Minneapolis 60.7% 15.3% 
Philadelphia 57.2% 9.6% 
Pittsburgh 60.2% 11.7% 
St. Louis 56.0% 8.0% 
AVERAGE-
15 cities 
58.9% 10.7% 
 Source: Same as Table 23      *includes some college work and associate degrees 
 
Second, the age structure of Milwaukee’s working-age black male population also 
contributes partially to explaining racial disparities in male joblessness in the city and region, as 
well as differences in black male joblessness between Milwaukee and other Frostbelt 
metropolises. Younger workers –those between the ages of 16 and 24—are more likely to be 
jobless in all cities and regions; as Tables 2 and 3 showed, Milwaukee is no exception. But, in 
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Milwaukee, a much higher proportion (28.0 percent) of working-age black males than white 
males (13.7 percent) fall into the 16 to 24 year-old age category; thus, as a younger community, 
working-age black males in the aggregate in Milwaukee are more likely to be jobless than white 
males.30
 
Table 25: 
Comparative Educational Attainment of  
Black Males In Frostbelt Metropolitan Areas 
% of black males, 25 and older, with high school,  
college or advanced degrees 
 
METROPOLITAN 
AREA 
% HIGH 
SCHOOL 
GRADUATE* 
% COLLEGE, 
PROFESSIONAL, 
OR ADVANCED 
DEGREE 
Baltimore 56.6% 14.4% 
Boston 54.9% 21.5% 
Buffalo 57.9% 9.9% 
Cincinnati 59.4% 12.3% 
Chicago 58.1% 14.3% 
Cleveland 61.0% 9.8% 
Columbus 61.7% 15.5% 
Detroit 59.9% 11.1% 
Indianapolis 61.4% 14.0% 
Kansas City 62.1% 13.8% 
Milwaukee 58.1% 9.9% 
Minneapolis 59.4% 20.9% 
Philadelphia 58.3% 12.2% 
Pittsburgh 63.4% 13.0% 
St. Louis 59.9% 11.9% 
AVERAGE-15 
cities 
59.5% 13.6% 
 Source: Same as Table 23          *includes some college work and associate degrees 
 
In the same vein, the “youth” component of Milwaukee’s working-age black male 
population is higher than in every other large Frostbelt city. Moreover, as Tables 26 and 27 
show, Milwaukee’s younger black male population is also significantly less likely than black 
male counterparts in other Frostbelt cities and metro areas to have attended college or secured  
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bachelor’s or more advanced degrees. Only 16.1 percent of metropolitan Milwaukee’s black 
males between the ages 18 to 24 reported various levels of post high-school education in 2000, 
compared to an average of 27.7 percent in the “benchmark” Frostbelt regions (see Table 27).  
This combination of comparative youth and limited educational attainment among Milwaukee’s 
working-age black males clearly is a factor shaping the region’s labor market.  
 
Table 26: 
Comparative Educational Attainment of  
Young Black Males In Frostbelt Cities 
% of black males, ages 18-24, with high school  
degree and at least some college attendance 
 
CITY % HIGH SCHOOL 
GRADUATE 
% POST HIGH SCHOOL 
EDUCATION*  
Baltimore 35.7% 25.3% 
Boston 31.6% 34.2% 
Buffalo 34.2% 28.2% 
Cincinnati 28.6% 24.0% 
Chicago 32.7% 27.0% 
Cleveland 30.3% 18.5% 
Columbus 34.0% 33.2% 
Detroit 35.7% 24.1% 
Indianapolis 30.9% 27.1% 
Kansas City 36.4% 23.3% 
Milwaukee 36.4% 15.3% 
Minneapolis 30.8% 25.7% 
Philadelphia 36.8% 25.8% 
Pittsburgh 36.3% 33.9% 
St. Louis 35.7% 18.3% 
AVERAGE-15 
cities 
33.7% 25.6% 
*Includes: some college attendance, associate degree, bachelor’s degree, advanced and professional degrees. 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Factfinder. Census 2000 Summary File 4. Table PCT 65 
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Table 27: 
Comparative Educational Attainment of  
Young Black Males In Frostbelt Metropolitan Areas 
% of black males, ages 18-24, with high school  
degree and at least some college attendance 
 
METROPOLITAN AREA % HIGH SCHOOL 
GRADUATE 
% POST-HIGH SCHOOL 
EDUCATION*  
Baltimore 34.9% 29.9%
Boston 31.6% 37.0%
Buffalo 30.5% 30.2%
Cincinnati 30.2% 26.3%
Chicago 33.6% 29.6%
Cleveland 32.3% 21.7%
Columbus 32.8% 31.4%
Detroit 35.0% 26.8%
Indianapolis 31.9% 26.1%
Kansas City 38.9% 25.6%
Milwaukee 36.6% 16.1%
Minneapolis 31.9% 29.2%
Philadelphia 34.7% 28.4%
Pittsburgh 38.4% 33.2%
St. Louis 35.4% 23.5%
AVERAGE-15 cities 33.9% 27.7%
*Includes: some college, associate degree, bachelor’s degree, advanced and professional degrees 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Factfinder. Census 2000 Summary File 4.  Table PCT 65 
 
However, although clearly part of the picture, these educational and demographic issues are 
hardly determinative in explaining Milwaukee’s black male joblessness. Chicago, Cleveland and 
Buffalo, for example, with lower “youth components” of their black male working-age 
populations than Milwaukee,31 nevertheless had comparable rates of black male joblessness in 
2005. Pittsburgh recorded a black male jobless rate in the city of 55.9 percent in 2005, despite a 
rate of post-high school education among young black males more than twice as high as 
Milwaukee’s. Clearly, in many settings, macroeconomic and other socio-economic factors trump 
education and demography in shaping labor market outcomes. 
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Nevertheless, these educational and demographic factors –added to the issues of 
deindustrialization, suburbanization, and segregation analyzed earlier—underscore the 
complicated forces shaping Milwaukee’s crisis of black male joblessness. These are daunting 
structural challenges requiring bold and comprehensive policies; however, Milwaukee’s policy 
response to this jobs crisis has been anything but “bold and comprehensive.” Moreover, as we 
shall see, the main strategies currently pursued in Milwaukee are unlikely to make much of a 
dent in the city’s soaring rate of black joblessness. 
 
VI. Local Policy and the Crisis of Black Male Joblessness in 
Milwaukee 
 
Although Milwaukee’s black male jobless rate first climbed over 50 percent by the early 
1980s, Milwaukee’s civic leadership hardly attacked the problem with urgency or 
aggressiveness. Henry Maier was Milwaukee’s mayor for 28 years, between 1960-1988, and the 
problems of inner city poverty and joblessness in the city’s burgeoning black community were 
not, to put it mildly, policy priorities during his tenure. Therefore, notwithstanding the surge in 
black joblessness during Maier’s tenure, it is not surprising that little attention was paid to the 
issue as city leaders adopted, in the words of one analyst, a “see-no-evil-hear-no-evil 
tendency.”32  
Maier’s successor as mayor, John O. Norquist, also saw little need for energetic 
government action, despite black male jobless rates that never dipped below 40 percent during 
his tenure. The city, in Norquist’s view, was an “efficient marketplace,” and activist government 
–which Norquist likened to “building a city on pity”-- was likely to create more economic 
problems than it solved, he believed.33 Indeed, Norquist adopted the curious stance that 
predominantly black inner city neighborhoods in Milwaukee, despite pervasive and increasing 
poverty, actually contained higher purchasing power –and hence presumably more “market-
based” economic development potential—than the seemingly more prosperous and rapidly 
growing suburbs ringing the city. Thus, one of his main responses to the crisis of black 
joblessness in the city was to publicize “purchasing power profiles” that would encourage 
heretofore-reticent developers to recognize Milwaukee’s “efficient” yet untapped markets, invest 
in the central city and presumably create jobs.34 The job-creation efficacy of Norquist’s market 
fundamentalism was unimpressive: during his tenure as mayor, the number of employed 
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residents in the city of Milwaukee declined by nearly 10 percent, and among the nation’s 50 
largest cities, Milwaukee ranked 47th in employment growth –hardly propitious “market” 
conditions to alleviate the crisis of black male joblessness.35  Unsurprisingly, over Norquist’s 
four terms as mayor the city’s black male jobless rate jumped substantially, by more than17 
percent.36  
In the early 1990s, the issue of black joblessness did briefly move to the forefront of 
Milwaukee’s political agenda. The catalyst was the vociferous political theatre of Alderman 
Michael McGee (Sr.), who threatened violence if the city’s crisis of black joblessness and inner 
city poverty were not alleviated by 1995. McGee’s heated rhetoric generated embarrassing 
national publicity for Milwaukee, including coverage by The New York Times and CBS’ 60 
Minutes, and prompted the city’s business elite to establish an “Minority Employment Task 
Force.” Co-chaired by the quintessential political odd couple --McGee and Hal Kuehl, head of 
Greater Milwaukee Committee (GMC) and CEO of the First Wisconsin bank-- the chief policy 
outcome of this task force was the creation in 1992 of the GMC’s “Employer Accords Program.” 
A voluntary program in which participating companies agreed to a goal that at least 10 percent of 
their new hires would be minorities, the accords generated about 8,500 new minority hires by 
2000, according to the GMC.37 The Employer Accords, however, were more a symbolic policy 
response than a real jobs program. Whatever increased minority hiring occurred through the 
accords was inadequate to keep pace with growth in the city’s black working-age population and 
effectively combat joblessness; in fact, between 1990 and 2000, the black male jobless rate in 
Milwaukee rose from 43.5 to 47.3 percent (see Table 16).  
Today, Milwaukee Mayor Tom Barrett and the region’s corporate leadership in the GMC 
and MMAC appear to have settled into a three-pronged “jobs strategy” to combat predominantly 
minority inner city joblessness: workforce development, minority entrepreneurship, and 
regionalism.38 All are worthy policy objectives and, in principle, can contribute to improving the 
local labor market. All, however, are deeply flawed as cornerstones of a local jobs strategy; in 
particular, without other more direct job creation policies, these approaches are unlikely to have 
a significant impact on the crisis of black male joblessness in Milwaukee. 
First, let’s consider workforce development and job training, which have become the 
mantras of virtually every “jobs” strategy in Milwaukee since the mid-1990s. The list of training-
centered jobs initiatives in Milwaukee is long and growing: the Wisconsin Regional Training 
Partnership (1992); the Milwaukee Jobs Initiative (1997); the Initiative for a Competitive 
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Milwaukee (2002); the “GROW” initiative (2005); and the Regional Workforce Alliance (2006) 
– to say nothing of the substantial, ongoing training operations of area technical colleges and 
private industry councils. In February 2007, Mayor Barrett proposed yet another training 
program: a “Mayor’s Office of Workforce Development,” which would be an “employer-
demand driven system,” coordinating existing services and eliminating duplication.39 Barrett 
squarely placed his proposal in the context of the need to attack the crisis of black male 
joblessness in Milwaukee: “In a city where in some neighborhoods, 58% of African-American 
men are not employed, I am not going to take a passive role,” said the mayor.40  
Yet, on the face of it, Barrett’s workforce development plan appears no different than the 
“training-is-the-answer” initiatives that have preceded it. All have promised to be “employer-
driven,” streamlined, and coordinated; thus, these intentions hardly mark the Barrett plan as a 
new departure. Yet, the earlier training initiatives have all fallen short in alleviating Milwaukee’s 
employment crisis. For example, the Milwaukee Jobs Initiative (MJI), sponsored by the Greater 
Milwaukee Committee, was touted as a “new” kind of training program, one that would “build 
well-marked routes from the neighborhoods to jobs with career potential,” providing “transition 
to work” support, and involving employers to design” special orientation and training programs 
in collaboration with trade associations, educators, union officials, and community leaders.”41 
“This is a new jobs initiative that actually is working,” said Robert H. Milbourne, then-executive 
director of the GMC. “It is employer-linked,” said Milbourne. “We go to the employer first, and 
therefore, when people are trained, they receive training, not just for the hope of getting a job, 
but for real jobs that exist before the training begins.”42 However, seven years after the MJI was 
launched, foundation funding43 ran out and it was abandoned, having self-reported the placement 
of a paltry 2,100 workers in jobs over the life of the initiative.  
Closely linked to MJI was the Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership (WRTP). Created 
in 1992 and still operating today, WRTP is a self-described labor market “intermediary,” pulling 
together a consortium of manufacturers, unions and public sector partners “to support the 
creation of high-performance workplaces and quality jobs in the Milwaukee region.” The WRTP 
claims to have assembled almost 100 member firms in the consortium, with combined 
employment of 65,000 in metro Milwaukee manufacturing.44 The “value-added” to the regional 
labor market by WRTP is described as follows: 
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At the core of the partnership are a series of channels for active communication and 
planning between employers and unions…Most of the employers either have or will have 
an on-site training center that provides continuous training and skill upgrading. A key 
component is the development of industry-specific skill standards, by employers, unions, 
and technical colleges in the region…. In addition, the partnership has embarked on two 
major initiatives to systematize access to entry-level jobs (a youth apprenticeship program 
and a training program for inner-city residents).45
 
WRTP has garnered national attention as a “model” regional training network, and the 
president of the Greater Milwaukee Committee, representing the city’s business elite, says: “The 
workforce development programs of WRTP have become an important economic development 
asset for economic growth and prosperity in our region.”46 But, the praise seems extravagant -- 
as do claims of the partnership’s impact on the Milwaukee labor market.47 According to the 
program’s architects: “The aggregate results of the WRTP are impressive. Taken together, 
WRTP members have stabilized manufacturing employment in the Milwaukee metro area, and 
indeed contributed about 6,000 additional industrial jobs to it…Direct training reaches some 
6,000 workers (one-quarter of whom are people of color)…”48  
In fact, since WRTP began operating in 1992, manufacturing employment –the target of 
the partnership—has not “stabilized”: it has declined by an astonishing 37 percent in the city of 
Milwaukee, the epicenter of partnership activity, and by 14 percent for metropolitan Milwaukee 
as a whole.49  Moreover, several companies listed as WRTP members –Tower Automotive, 
Master Lock, and Johnson Controls—were responsible for significant layoffs and plant closings 
in Milwaukee’s inner city during the 1990s (and beyond) when WRTP was allegedly 
“reforming” labor relations at member companies.50 Hyperbolic claims about the impact of 
WRTP may have generated substantial foundation grants and consulting contracts for the 
partnership, but there is very little evidence that this workforce development program has had a 
significant impact on local job creation or the functioning of the Milwaukee regional labor 
market.  
Why have these past workforce development efforts failed to reduce Milwaukee’s black 
male jobless rate – and why is the Barrett administration’s new plan, as well as other new 
training programs in the region, equally unlikely to succeed? The answer is simple: workforce 
development policy in Milwaukee and elsewhere is based on the fallacious assumptions that 
enough jobs exist for properly trained workers, or that with adequate training enough private-
sector jobs will materialize for all workers. As Louis Uchitelle has written in his important book, 
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The Disposable American: Layoffs and their Consequences: “The myth –promoted by 
economists, educators, business executives, and nearly all of the nation’s political leaders, 
Democrats and Republicans alike—holds that in America’s vibrant and flexible economy there is 
work, at good pay, for the educated and skilled. The unemployed need only to get themselves 
educated and skilled and the work will materialize. Education and training create jobs, according 
to this way of thinking.”51
This is a “supply-side” approach to the labor market: train the unemployed and they will 
be prepared for skilled jobs that currently go unfilled in metropolitan areas, or new jobs will be 
created by private employers to take advantage of increasing skills in the workforce.52  However, 
as Timothy Bartik of the Upjohn Institute has pointed out, “a key limitation of labor supply 
programs is that…they do nothing to create additional jobs for the poor.”53 Thus, Bartik argues, 
when we “train low-education persons and then push them into the labor market, the private 
labor market will not create a sufficient number of jobs to employ all these labor market entrants. 
One possibility is that one-third to two-thirds of the labor market entrants will fail to obtain jobs. 
Alternatively, if more of the new entrants obtain jobs, their success will come at the expense of 
other low-education workers who will lose jobs, displaced because fewer job vacancies will be 
available.” Moreover, without policies to increase the demand for labor, increasing the supply of 
new workers (regardless of their “customized” job training) will exert downward pressure on the 
wages of all low- to moderate-skill workers.  In other words, particularly in stagnant labor 
markets like Milwaukee’s, what labor economist Gordon Lafer has called the “job training 
charade” will fail to significantly improve employment prospects for the jobless; moreover, 
absent job creation policies to increase the demand for low- and moderate-skilled labor, “supply 
side” policies like job training can have the perverse impact of depressing wages and increasing  
 
UWM Center for Economic Development 
 
48
the number of the working poor.54 Thus, concludes Lafer:   
Whatever the problem, it seems, job training is the answer. The only trouble 
is, it doesn’t work, and the government knows it. The most comprehensive 
evaluation of training programs, conducted by the Department of Labor, 
followed 20,000 people over four years. For the vast majority, the government 
concluded that training made no difference at all. 
 
It is tempting to think that these meager results are due to mismanagement in 
one program. However, every training program reports similar anemic 
outcomes, whether publicly or privately run, for welfare recipients, high 
school dropouts or laid-off union workers. Indeed, in studying more than 40 
years of job training policy, I have not seen one program that, on average, 
enabled its participants to earn their way out of poverty.55
 
Unfortunately, civic leadership in Milwaukee –from Mayor Barrett to the presidents of the 
MMAC and GMC to the editorial board of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel-- has apparently 
adopted the myth that there enough jobs paying a living wage in metropolitan Milwaukee for all 
able-bodied jobless; that the core of Milwaukee’s employment problem is that it suffers from a 
shortage of skilled workers (a “jobs-skills mismatch”) rather than a shortage of jobs; and that 
therefore job training should be the centerpiece of a local “jobs strategy.” As the Journal Sentinel 
recently editorialized on Barrett’s workforce development plan: “Too many people, especially 
those in the city, go without work while blue-collar jobs in area companies with good wages and 
benefits go unfilled.”56  And this from Julia Taylor and Tim Sheehy, presidents of the GMC and 
MMAC, respectively: “Our call to action as a community is to meet the need for a skilled work 
force and to link our inner city residents to jobs. The jobs are already here. Daily, calls come 
from employers looking for a prepared work force (emphasis added).”57
The jobs are already here? This is quite a statement in a region that has experienced a four 
percent employment decline since 2000 (with a seven percent drop in the city of Milwaukee 
alone).58 In fact, much more than a skills shortage, metro Milwaukee faces an imposing jobs 
shortage. As Table 28 shows, there is a huge gap in the Milwaukee region between the number 
of jobless, and the number of available jobs, a gap that has increased significantly since 2000 as 
the region’s job creation machinery has sputtered. Put another way, there simply are not enough 
jobs available in the region to provide full-employment to the working-age population –a 
sobering reality that is further complicated, as we examined earlier, by racial segregation and a 
spatial mismatch between the inner city jobless and the location of available jobs in the region.  
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Data on job vacancies in metropolitan Milwaukee are available from an annual survey of 
employers conducted for the Milwaukee County Private Industry Council by the University of 
Wisconsin-Milwaukee Employment and Training Institute.  To calculate whether “the jobs are 
already here” or whether Milwaukee suffers from a jobs shortage, we have compared these job 
availability numbers, in 2000 and 2005, with the number of working-age jobless during those 
years, by race and sex, in Milwaukee. For the purposes of this analysis, we have excluded from 
the tabulation of the jobless: 1) teenagers (many of whom are students or otherwise voluntarily 
not in the labor force); and 2) working-age females not in labor force, many of whom are out of 
the labor force for voluntary reasons (such as “stay-at-home” mothers). We know, however, that 
at least some teenagers and working-age females are clearly involuntarily out of the labor force; 
thus, the large gap we have calculated between “available workers” and “available jobs” is a 
conservative estimate that actually understates the extent to which there is a job shortage in 
metro Milwaukee for the working-age population. 
 In 2000, as Table 28 shows, metro Milwaukee had 91,676 potential job-seekers (working-
age residents between the ages of 20-64 who were unemployed or out of the labor force), but 
employers reported only 38,314 job vacancies; thus, metro Milwaukee faced a shortage of 
53,362 jobs. By 2005, this job gap had grown to 88,294. There were six jobless Milwaukeeans 
for every available job in 2005; there were an astounding nine jobless for every available full-
time job.59 In fact, in 2005 there were more jobless working-age black males alone (20,768) than 
there were total job vacancies (18,772) in metropolitan Milwaukee.  
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Table 28: 
Metro Milwaukee’s Job Gap: 2000-2005 
The Gap Between Available Jobs and the Jobless in the Region 
 
number of residents, ages 20-64, by race and sex, either  
officially unemployed or not in the labor force; and 
number of job vacancies reported in employer survey 
 
 2000 
GROUP UNEMPLOYED OUT OF LABOR 
FORCE 
TOTAL JOBLESS 
 
White Males 9,160 36,809 45,969
Black Males 5,801 16,572 22,373
Hispanic Males 1,837 6,704 8,541
All Females 14,793 N/C 14,793
Total (A) 31,591 60,085 91,676
 
Job Vacancies Full-Time Part-Time Total Vacancies 
Total (B) 24,242 14,072 38,314
 
Shortage of Available Jobs (A minus B) 53,362
 
 
 2005 
GROUP UNEMPLOYED OUT OF LABOR 
FORCE 
TOTAL JOBLESS
 
White Males 15,159 41,378 56,537
Black Males 6,004 14,764 20,768
Hispanic Males 4,510 5,119 9,629
All Females 20,132 N/C 20,132
Total (A) 45,805 61,261 107,132
 
Job Vacancies Full-Time Part-Time Total Vacancies 
Total (B) 12,381 6,391 18,772
 
Shortage of Available Jobs (A minus B) 88,294
N/C = not calculated 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census 2000, Summary File 4; U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 
2005; and University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Employment and Training Institute, Milwaukee Area Job Openings Survey, 
May 2006, p. 14; and University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Employment and Training Institute, Survey of Job Openings in the 
Milwaukee Metropolitan Area: Week of May 15, 2000, p. 1. 
 
These job gap calculations make abundantly clear just how misguided is the diagnosis of 
the local labor market by Mayor Barrett and the leaders of the GMC and MMAC. Given 
Milwaukee’s gap between available jobs and available workers, public policy predicated on the 
belief that “the jobs are already here” and that a new office of workforce development constitutes 
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a “jobs strategy” is a recipe for failure and will do little to bring down Milwaukee’s staggeringly 
high rate of black male joblessness. To repeat: it is a jobs shortage, much more than a skills 
shortage that plagues the Milwaukee economy.  
This point is further underscored when we look at the skills requirements for occupations 
that have been identified by the Bureau of Labor Statistics as those likely to exhibit the greatest 
growth in the next decade. As Table 29 shows, the vast majority of 
Table 29: 
The 10 Occupations With Largest Projected 
Job Growth Nationally, 2004-14 
Numbers of jobs in thousands 
 
OCCUPATION 2004 2014 # MOST SIGNIFICANT 
SOURCE OF POST-
SECONDARY EDUCATION 
OR TRAINING 
Retail Salespersons 4,256 4,992 736 Short-term on-the-job training 
Registered Nurses 2,394 3,096 702 Associate degree 
Postsecondary teachers 1,628 2,153 525 Doctoral degree 
Customer service reps 2,063 2,534 471 Moderate-term on-the-job 
training 
Janitors and cleaners 2,374 2,813 439 Short-term on-the-job training 
Waiters and waitresses 2,252 2,627 375 Short-term on-the-job training 
Food preparation and 
serving workers 
2,150 2,516 366 Short-term on-the-job training 
Home health aides 624 974 350 Short-term on-the-job training 
Nursing aides, 
orderlies, attendants 
1,455 1,781 326 Postsecondary vocational award 
General and operations 
managers 
1,807 2,115 308 Bachelor’s or higher degree, 
plus work experience 
 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, (www.bls.gov/news.release/ecopro.t06.htm) 
 
projected job growth is in occupations requiring short-term, on-the-job training. True, many of 
these jobs are part-time and do not pay family-supporting wages; but that’s an issue that requires 
changes in labor market rules (i.e. higher minimum wage, easier unionization) rather than more 
job training. “Any individual may benefit from education,” writes Gordon Lafer, but the bottom 
line is that “most jobs do not require much in the way of sophisticated training. Fully two-thirds 
of American jobs are in occupations that do not require a college degree.”60 The same situation  
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exists in metropolitan Milwaukee: according to the survey by the UWM Employment and 
Training Institute, 69 percent of the available jobs in the region in May 2006 did not require a 
college degree.61
 All these data suggest that the primary need in Milwaukee is not improved job training, but 
rather policies that increase the demand for low- to moderate-skilled labor and attack the critical 
shortage of available jobs in the region. This is not to say, of course, that workforce development 
does not play an important role in Milwaukee’s labor market system; but, there is no evidence 
that Milwaukee’s current array and structure of training programs is inferior to other cities or 
regions or explains anything about levels of joblessness here. In the last analysis, as Timothy 
Bartik argues: “The empirical evidence suggests that labor supply policies [such as job training] 
are limited because they have only modest effects on helping low-income Americans increase 
their employment…More targeted labor demand policies are also needed…Empirical evidence 
suggests that public-service employment programs or wage subsidy programs for private 
employers can be effective in increasing the employment and earnings of low-income 
Americans.”62 We shall return shortly to what such labor demand policies might look like in 
Milwaukee and how they can help alleviate the crisis of black male joblessness here. 
The second key element in Milwaukee’s emerging strategy to combat high rates of 
minority joblessness is “minority entrepreneurship.” A host of programs to boost minority 
business ownership in the region have been launched in the recent years: MBE and DBE 
requirements for projects such as Miller Park, the Midwest Airlines Center, the Marquette 
Interchange project, and the City Hall restoration; the Urban Entrepreneur Partnership; elements 
of Midcities Venture Management and Johnson Controls’ “Metro Markets” initiatives; and the 
Initiative for a Competitive Milwaukee which, although acknowledged by one of its consultants 
to be essentially “dissolved,” is still touted by GMC president Julia Taylor as “an effort to start 
and expand minority businesses.”63
What is the logic behind minority entrepreneurship as a minority employment strategy? 
Minority-owned firms tend to hire a higher percentage of minorities than other businesses; thus, 
increasing the number and scale of minority-owned firms will presumably boost minority 
employment. As former GMC executive director Robert Milbourne put it, helping minority 
companies grow will “stimulate economic development among the group of businesses that is in 
the best position to hire those who need employment among central-city residents.”64    
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There are many reasons to support minority entrepreneurship in Milwaukee: expanding 
business opportunities, enhancing wealth creation in minority communities and diversifying the 
region’s business class are chief among them. Milwaukee ranks near the bottom among U.S. 
metropolitan areas in minority business ownership according to most recent studies, so there is 
much to be done here.65 But, there is strong reason to doubt the efficacy of minority 
entrepreneurship as a strategy for combating black male joblessness in Milwaukee. We have 
examined whether there is a correlation nationally in metropolitan areas between levels of high 
black business ownership and low rates of black joblessness; for the 50 largest metropolitan 
areas in the country, we found a low correlation of +.249, which translates into a very weak 
positive relationship between the two variables. This lack of a strong relationship between black 
business ownership and low black joblessness is illustrated in Table 30, which shows very little 
variation –and certainly no linear relationship-- in black jobless rates in metro areas ranked by 
their rates of black business ownership. 
The reason why minority business ownership correlates poorly with low minority 
joblessness in a community and why minority entrepreneurship programs are not prodigious job 
creators is clear. Even in cities with a relatively high ranking in the rate of minority business 
ownership, minority-owned businesses employ only a tiny fraction of overall employment. Thus, 
even large increases in the number of minority-owned firms –typically small businesses with 
few, if any, employees—will predictably have a tiny impact on overall employment or minority 
jobless rates.     
 
Table 30 
Black Business Ownership and Black Joblessness in Metropolitan Areas 
Black jobless rates in nation’s 50 largest metro areas, ranked by 
rate of black business ownership 
 
RANK IN BLACK-OWNED FIRMS PER 
1,000 BLACK POPULATION (1997) 
AVERAGE BLACK JOBLESS RATE 
(2000) 
Top 10 Metropolitan Areas 43.65% 
Metro Areas Ranked 11-20 40.07% 
Metro Areas Ranked 21-30 46.78% 
Metro Areas Ranked 31-40 44.94% 
Metro Areas Ranked 41-50 46.56% 
 Sources: Metropolitan areas ranking in black-owned firms per 1,000 population calculated in Marc V. Levine, Minority 
Business Ownership in Metropolitan Milwaukee in the 1990s: Some Statistical Indicators and Comparisons to the Nation’s 
Largest Metropolitan Areas (Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Center for Economic Development, 2001); 
Jobless data from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census 2000, Summary File 4 
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 Take, for example, metropolitan Atlanta, generally acknowledged to be one of the 
country’s success stories in minority entrepreneurialism and a powerhouse in promoting black 
business ownership. Black-owned firms account for just 1.5 percent of the Atlanta region’s 
employment, and just three percent of the city of Atlanta’s private-sector jobs. There were only 
9,300 employees in black-owned firms in the city of Atlanta in 2002; thus, even doubling that 
total over a decade –a formidable goal—would have a relatively trivial impact on the city’s black 
jobless rate.66
Similarly, in Milwaukee, black-owned firms reported only 6,525 employees in 2002 (under 
one percent of the region’s jobs), a small increase of only 205 employees from 6,320 in 1997 – 
even in the face of MBE and DBE requirements on major public projects, as well as city’s 
growing portfolio of minority entrepreneurship programs.67 Although it is likely that more 
concerted efforts to promote black-business ownership in Milwaukee can improve somewhat on 
these job growth numbers, simple arithmetic makes it implausible that increases in black 
business ownership will make more than a trivial contribution to reducing the city’s rate of black 
male joblessness. 
Finally, the third key element in Mayor Barrett and corporate Milwaukee’s emerging 
economic development strategy is regionalism. The ill-fated Initiative for a Competitive 
Milwaukee was to have been the centerpiece of a regionally-oriented inner city revitalization 
program, containing ambitious plans to connect predominantly minority inner city jobless to 
growth “clusters” in the regional economy. But, after four years of inaction, the ICM and its 
“clusters” plan have, as we noted earlier, essentially “dissolved.” 
Milwaukee’s major new regional initiative is the so-called “Milwaukee-7” (M-7), in which 
the seven counties of southeastern Wisconsin68 join together in a “Regional Economic Council” 
whose job it will be “to package the many individual strengths of the seven southeastern 
Wisconsin counties…and market the region as a whole.”69 The core of the M-7 is a five-year, 
$12 million marketing campaign to “brand” the region, improve its image, and sell it to 
businesses shopping for new locations. So far, the M-7 has produced a fancy new web site 
(“ChooseMilwaukee.com”), lots of rhetoric about regional “cooperation,” “competitiveness,” 
“positioning,” and “marketing,” but precious few specifics about what regionalism could mean 
for Milwaukee’s inner city jobless – beyond the boilerplate language du jour about the need for 
regional workforce development to prepare for the “global economy.” Perhaps an explicit 
strategy for combating the crisis of black male joblessness in Milwaukee will be part of the  
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M-7’s “economic positioning strategy,” the delayed unveiling of which is now slated for spring 
2007.  “This unique plan” promises leaders of the initiative,” will lead to a comprehensive 
identification of our regional assets and economic opportunities, layered against a backdrop of 
our distinctive geographic resources and global trends.”70 It remains unclear, however, what that 
bundle of buzzwords will mean concretely for the jobless in Milwaukee’s predominantly black 
inner city neighborhoods. 
Mayor Barrett, in explaining the city’s support for the M-7, stated: “I need more family-
supporting jobs in this community. I recognize that the city needs the suburbs and the suburbs 
need the city,” and that a job gained in the region will be “everyone’s” gain.71 This is an 
astonishingly naïve view of Milwaukee’s recent economic history, and a flawed analysis of the 
dynamics of regional labor markets here.  As we examined earlier, all of the net job growth in 
metro Milwaukee over the past two decades has been in the exurban counties. Yet, few 
minorities secured any of these exurban jobs (see Table 22), and there was no discernible “trickle 
down” effect of exurban job growth to the city of Milwaukee, where jobless rates for working-
age black males continued to soar. Incredibly, in the face of this trend, Barrett told a meeting of 
the Greater Milwaukee Committee on regional cooperation in 2005: “Our problem is not so 
much that the city hasn’t grown, but that the suburbs haven’t grown enough.” (emphasis 
added).72  
The new rhetoric about regional cooperation from the mayor and business leaders is 
encouraging, but if the M-7 “marketing” campaign succeeds in luring employers to Walworth 
county –or, for that matter, to the exurban communities of metro Milwaukee—there will be few 
economic benefits for inner city residents (and black male jobless in particular). Indeed, jobless 
in the entire city of Milwaukee –regardless of race or gender—will benefit from suburban growth 
only if explicit policies are put into place to spread the benefits of growth throughout the region, 
such as tax-base sharing and regional transit linkages. In the most recent regional jobs survey, 
almost 90 percent of the entry-level job openings in metro Milwaukee were in suburban and 
exurban locations; only 4 percent were located in the inner city neighborhoods where almost all 
of the region’s working-age black males live.73 Unless the mayor and other M-7 leaders put into 
place regional policies to address this spatial mismatch, and embrace regional equity policies in 
transportation and public finance that could truly enhance the economic prospects of the inner 
city, then Milwaukee’s new era of regional cooperation will be irrelevant for the inner city’s 
predominantly black jobless. However, when the mayor of Milwaukee states that the region’s big 
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challenge is that “the suburbs haven’t grown enough,” that is a troubling sign of cluelessness 
about the true nature of the jobs crisis in Milwaukee, a crisis that, in any event, goes beyond the 
ameliorative capacity of “branding strategies” or the new regional image sought by the mayor 
and the M-7 leadership.74    
In sum, the three key elements of Milwaukee’s emerging strategy to combat inner city 
joblessness – workforce development, minority entrepreneurship, and M-7-style regionalism—
are seriously flawed. They are all based on a series of false assumptions regarding the job 
creation process in Milwaukee and a misdiagnosis of the nature of the crisis of inner city 
joblessness. Once again, this is not to deny that workforce development and minority 
entrepreneurship have an important place in Milwaukee’s economic development arsenal; but, as 
cornerstones of a strategy to combat black male joblessness, they have already been found 
wanting. And M-7-style regionalism, even at this early stage, looks suspiciously devoid of 
meaningful strategies –such as regional equity policies—that could spur inner city revitalization 
and reduce joblessness.  
The time has come to fundamentally rethink Milwaukee’s approach towards reducing inner 
city joblessness in general (and black male joblessness in particular). Workforce development, 
minority entrepreneurship, and M-7 regionalism are inadequate, and traditional economic 
development policy in Milwaukee –consisting mainly of real-estate development and business 
incentives—has clearly failed to produce consistent, sustained job growth. What, then, are the 
alternatives?  
 
VII. Policy Options: New Directions to Combat Black Male 
Joblessness in Milwaukee 
 
The modestly good news on black male joblessness in Milwaukee over the past two years 
may offer some clues towards identifying promising policy options.  As reported in Table 16, 
Milwaukee’s black male jobless rate, after peaking at 51.5 percent in 2003, declined to 44.1 
percent in 2005, according to the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS). 
The ACS, as we’ve noted, has a rather wide margin of error, so this finding must be interpreted 
with caution (see Appendix). But if the decline reflects real reduction in the rate of black male 
joblessness and not just “statistical noise,” it is obviously a positive development, even if a 
jobless rate of 44.1 percent remains unacceptably high. 
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What factors might account for this change? Clearly, reductions in black joblessness 
cannot be attributed to propitious macroeconomic trends in the city and surrounding 
communities during this period: according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, between 2003-2005 
the number of employed residents in the city of Milwaukee fell by 2,937, and declined by 481 in 
the Milwaukee County suburbs. Any decline in black male joblessness during this period, 
therefore, was not a matter of the proverbial “rising tide lifting all boats.” Milwaukee’s economy 
remained stagnant. 
 However, one of the largest public work projects in Milwaukee’s history was launched 
during this period, the $810 million Marquette Interchange project. This huge project to rebuild a 
vital part of the region’s highway network not only injected a substantial, Keynesian-style 
stimulus to the Milwaukee economy, but also contained explicit minority-hiring goals.  As a 
result, direct hiring on the project gave an important boost to minority employment in 
Milwaukee: through mid-2006, according to WisDOT, 954 minority workers had been employed 
on the Marquette project, 410 of whom were African American.75  
Similarly, programs such the city of Milwaukee’s “Residents Preference Program” (RPP), 
mandating hiring preferences on city public works and economic development projects to 
residents of targeted, low-income neighborhoods, also had a salutary effect on the labor market 
for minorities (and, presumably, the black male jobless population). By the end of 2005, for 
example, the $70 million City Hall restoration project reported that workers qualified by RPP 
performed 20.8 percent of the project’s “total onsite construction hours,” and minorities secured 
27.4 percent of the project’s work hours.76 (The two categories overlap, of course). This means 
that approximately 220 FTE construction jobs have been secured by minorities on the City Hall 
restoration project, an excellent example of how public works projects, combined with 
government regulations, can effectively stimulate the demand for labor, even in an otherwise 
stagnant local labor market. To be sure, supply-side policies have facilitated this process: the job-
readiness, training and placement services of the BIG STEP/WRTP “Center of Excellence” have 
helped prepare and place candidates for jobs in the skilled trades and industries.77 But, the 
linchpin for job growth here was not on the supply side; the catalyst was public investment, 
combined with hiring regulations, which increased the demand for low- to moderate-skilled 
minority-community workers. This case supports Timothy Bartik’s conclusion that “job training 
and other labor supply policies also are more effective when overall labor demand is strong.”78
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What are the policy implications of the promising impact on minority employment of the 
Marquette Interchange and City Hall restoration projects?  First, these examples underscore the 
importance of public investment in creating jobs in a stagnant labor market. Increasing the 
demand for low- and moderate-skilled workers will be essential to reducing the rate of black 
male joblessness in Milwaukee. Like older U.S. cities, Milwaukee suffers from aging and, in 
some cases, crumbling infrastructure, which affects not only the economic productivity of the 
city and the region, but ultimately quality of life. The American Society of Civil Engineers 
estimates that across the country there is a pressing need for at least $1.6 trillion in public 
infrastructure investments.79  The U.S. Conference of Mayors has made “infrastructure 
investment and jobs” a top priority.80  Major investments in renewed infrastructure in Milwaukee 
–schools and roads, for example, badly in need of replacement and renovation—would not only 
create immediate jobs for inner city jobless, but would also enhance the long-term economic 
competitiveness and job-creation machinery of the region. 
Let’s push this even a step further: a perfect example of such a jobs-producing, 
competitiveness-enhancing infrastructure investment would be a regional light rail system. 
Anchored in downtown Milwaukee, a rail transit system could knit the region together 
economically, enhance productivity by improving commuting efficiency, make it easier for 
central city jobless to access jobs in growth areas of the region, and stimulate station-area 
redevelopment. Moreover, combined with muscular regionalism –not the “branding” and 
“marketing” thrust of the M-7, but a serious regional planning framework—a regional rail 
system could help slow down suburban sprawl, shape regional land use in economically 
productive and environmentally sound ways, and help encourage private reinvestment in the 
urban core. 
In its political resistance to light rail, Milwaukee is increasingly isolated among U.S. 
cities. “Peer” cities such as Baltimore, St. Louis, and Minneapolis have invested in rail systems 
in recent years, and regions such as Denver and Portland have plans for even more extensive, 
regional rail networks; in 2004, Denver approved a $4.7 billion bond issue for a twenty-year, 
119-mile regional rail transit expansion.  58 percent of voters in Denver and six surrounding 
counties supported the Denver “FasTracks” investment. 
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In the November 2006 elections as well, voters across the country  -- in conservative “Red 
States” as well as more liberal “Blue States” --approved a number of local ballot measures for 
rail transit. Nearly two-thirds of the voters in Salt Lake and Utah counties approved a proposition 
raising the sales tax to expand the region’s light rail and commuter rail systems. In Kansas City, 
voters approved financing of a $975 million, 27-mile-long light rail line.81
Mystifyingly, Milwaukee remains outside of these trends – even in archconservative, anti- 
big government Texas, cities such as Dallas and Houston have invested in light rail systems. Of 
the 15 “Frostbelt” regions against which we have benchmarked employment trends in this study, 
only Milwaukee and Detroit lack a rail transit system in operation, development, or planning.82 
The more that stubborn politicians and know-nothing talk radio hosts in Milwaukee mobilize 
resistance to light rail, the more the region risks falling further behind our competitors 
economically, and the more we lose the opportunity for a “big bang” investment that could 
ameliorate the labor market for low- to moderate-skilled workers, and have a real impact in 
reducing the rate of black male joblessness in this community. If the M-7 leadership truly wishes 
to harness “regional cooperation” to both improve the economic position of the Milwaukee 
region as well as expand employment opportunities for Milwaukee’s jobless, then using the M-
7’s political capital to promote a regional light rail system should be a top priority.   
 A second key policy conclusion from Milwaukee’s recent history is that targeted hiring 
standards attached to local investments can improve the employment prospects for minorities and 
the disadvantaged. The RPP and minority hiring goals on the Marquette project and City Hall 
restoration helped generate employment for inner city jobless. Such standards should be 
vigorously pursued (and monitored) on all public works projects in the region; this is a direct 
way of leveraging existing public investments to meet targeted community employment needs.   
But, Milwaukee should go a step further in channeling investment to enhance the 
employment prospects of those most in need. Historically, one of the central weaknesses of 
traditional economic development policies has been that business incentives and subsidies have 
gone to private developers often with little evidence that low-income residents have benefited 
from these policies. In a growing number of cities around the country, “community benefits 
agreements” (CBAs) have been attached to major redevelopment projects, to give preferential 
hiring to inner city residents and minorities, and to require developers receiving public subsidies 
to meet job creation and wage standards. In Milwaukee, as redevelopment continues, particularly 
in downtown and surrounding neighborhoods, CBAs offer a way to maximize the likelihood that 
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working-age black males, as well as all workers living in disadvantaged neighborhoods, will 
secure living-wage employment as a result of publicly-subsidized redevelopment projects.  The 
Park East corridor CBA, enacted by Milwaukee County, is one example of a local CBA, but the 
city of Milwaukee should also routinely attach CBAs to agreements with individual developers 
as well redevelopment zones such as the Park East corridor.  
Finally, as we examined earlier in this report, a key element differentiating the situation 
facing working-age black males in Milwaukee compared to other Frostbelt regions is the degree 
to which racial segmentation characterizes the metropolitan labor market. In Milwaukee, only 8 
percent of working-age black males lived in the suburbs in 2005, compared to an average of 49 
percent in the “benchmark” Frostbelt metropolitan areas. This geographic segmentation, we 
pointed out, dramatically limits employment opportunities for Milwaukee’s working-age black 
males, concentrated in inner city neighborhoods, generally inaccessible to the more dynamic 
labor markets of suburban and exurban communities. 
 Tables 31 and 32 show how jobless rates for working-age black males vary by place of 
residence in a sample of metropolitan areas. In each case, the black male jobless rates are 
substantially lower in the suburbs than in the city, for both the entire working-age population 
(Table 31) as well as “prime working-age males,” those between 25 and 54 years old (Table 32).  
 
Table 31: 
Why opening up the Suburbs Matters: I 
Jobless rates for all working-age black males (ages 16-64) 
in selected metropolitan areas, 2005 
by place of residence 
 
METROPOLITAN AREA JOBLESS RATE, BLACK 
MALES LIVING IN 
CENTRAL CITY 
JOBLESS RATE, BLACK 
MALES LIVING IN 
SUBURBS 
Atlanta 35.8% 27.0%
Baltimore 39.8% 24.3%
Boston 33.6% 24.3%
Chicago 48.3% 34.9%
Cleveland 49.6% 34.9%
Detroit 48.9% 30.7%
St. Louis 49.2% 35.6%
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2005. 
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Table 32: 
Why opening up the Suburbs Matters: II 
Jobless rates for prime working-age black males (ages 25-54) 
in selected metropolitan areas, 2005 
by place of residence 
 
METROPOLITAN AREA JOBLESS RATE, BLACK 
MALES LIVING IN 
CENTRAL CITY 
JOBLESS RATE, BLACK 
MALES LIVING IN 
SUBURBS 
Atlanta 25.1% 17.6%
Baltimore 31.3% 13.0%
Boston 24.9% 16.2%
Chicago 37.7% 24.7%
Cleveland 41.3% 23.5%
Detroit 37.9% 20.9%
St. Louis 40.1% 24.4%
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2005. 
 
 The policy implications of these data seem clear: a critical element of a jobs strategy in 
Milwaukee must involve opening up the suburban labor markets of the region to racial diversity. 
“Opening up the suburbs” might include several policy options, but the two most important are 
transportation and housing. Regional transportation policies must be realigned to facilitate the 
access of central city workers to suburban employment centers; and building affordable housing 
in the suburbs is essential, so that low- to –moderate-skilled workers, with limited incomes, can 
live in greater proximity to the location of 90 percent of the region’s entry-level job openings. 
David Rusk, for example, has detailed how in affluent Montgomery County, Maryland –a suburb 
of Washington, D.C. – “aggressive mixed-income housing policies” have diversified the county 
and reduced economic segregation.83 If the M-7 leadership is serious about cultivating “regional 
cooperation,” then developing regional transportation and affordable housing strategies would be 
an excellent point of departure. 
In conclusion, three approaches to regional job creation –investment in public 
infrastructure, community benefits agreements, and opening up the suburbs—offer promise for 
alleviating the crisis of black male joblessness in Milwaukee. These strategies are not panaceas 
for the crisis, and clearly they are not politically expedient policies: there is ferocious political 
opposition in Milwaukee, for example, to light rail, community benefits agreements, and 
affordable housing in the suburbs. The current array of metro Milwaukee policies –training, 
entrepreneurship, and regional “branding”—may be politically more feasible, but, as we have 
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seen, are unlikely to make a dent in Milwaukee’s jobs crisis. As Gordon Lafer points out in The 
Job Training Charade: “Training is popular not because it meets a critical need of any 
constituency, but because it makes minimal demands on those in power and has little effect in 
reshaping the labor market.”84 Milwaukee desperately needs “demand-side” policies that reshape 
the regional labor market, if we are to seriously tackle the problem of black male joblessness 
here. This is the time for bold action, not political expediency. 
The crisis of black male joblessness is complicated, and this study—focused on certain 
structural economic factors-- covers but a part of the issue. In the long run, human capital –
education—is critical to improving Milwaukee’s labor market. As we saw in Tables 23-27, the 
schooling deficit among Milwaukee’s working-age black males is generally worse than for black 
males in other cities, racial gaps in education in Milwaukee and across the country are enormous, 
and “reconnecting disadvantaged young men” to quality school systems remains a Sisyphusean 
challenge for policymakers.85  In addition, recent studies in Baltimore and Chicago have 
documented the degree to which finding work is increasingly problematic for young black males 
in an era of mass incarceration.86  In Baltimore, 52 percent of African American males between 
the ages of 20 and 30 are “under the control of the criminal justice system”: in jail or prison, or 
on probation or parole.87 Milwaukee’s situation is comparable: according to recently released 
report by John Pawasarat at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, an estimated 40 percent of 
African American males ages 25 through 29 currently living in Milwaukee County have spent 
time in the Wisconsin corrections system; 42 percent of 30-34 year olds have likewise been 
incarcerated.88 At a minimum, such social realities constitute important “barriers to 
employment” and complicate the potential impact of the labor market strategies we have 
explored here. 
But, notwithstanding the complexities of improving urban education or grappling with the 
sociology of inner city life, generating aggregate job growth is a sine qua non for alleviating the 
crisis of black male joblessness. The policy options we have outlined are just a starting point and 
certainly are not a panacea. But increasing the demand for low- and moderate-skilled labor in 
Milwaukee can reduce black male joblessness and at least bring Milwaukee’s rates more in line 
with other Frostbelt cities (although, of course, rates elsewhere remain too high as well). As we 
have seen, current policies are unlikely to seriously attack the city’s alarmingly high inner city 
jobless rate, and it is time to rethink local strategy. We can do better. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Note on Data 
 
This study uses a variety of data sources from the U.S. Bureau of the Census: the decennial 
census, the economic census, and county business patterns; as well as data on employment from 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
For the most recent data on race and employment in cities and metropolitan areas, we have 
used the American Community Survey (ACS). A new annual nationwide survey conducted by the 
U.S. Bureau of the Census since 2001, the ACS is meant to provide annual information on 
various social, economic, and demographic characteristics of the population ordinarily available 
every ten years in the decennial census “long form.”  
However, nationally, the 2005 ACS surveyed about 3 million households, compared to 17 
million in the Census 2000 long form; thus, statistically, the ACS data contain larger sampling 
error than the census long form. The ACS reports this sampling error as “margin of error” 
alongside estimated values for specific variables. 
ACS samples for urban areas, especially when broken down by race and ethnicity, are 
small enough in some cases to contain rather substantial error margins. For example, the 2005 
ACS estimate for the black male jobless rate in metropolitan Milwaukee was 43.1 percent; 
however, taking into account the margin of error indicated by ACS, the statistical range of 
possible values for this variable was from 32.6 percent to 53.6 percent. Although this error 
margin is substantial, it is no greater than the statistical range contained in the local data 
historically provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (and routinely used by researchers and 
policymakers) on race, ethnicity, and unemployment in its report, The Geographical Profile of 
Employment and Unemployment. For example, in 2002, the most recent BLS report on race and 
unemployment estimated a black male unemployment rate (note: not jobless rate) in Milwaukee 
of 19.7 percent, with an “error range of rate” of 12.9 to 26.5 percent.  
It goes with the territory of small samples on local employment data that there will be a 
substantial error range, particularly when the sample is broken down into even smaller 
components by race, ethnicity, and sex. This means, as we note in the study, that care must be 
exercised in interpreting changes in jobless rates from one year to the next or differences 
between cities or metro areas, all of which might merely reflect measurement “noise.” For 
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example, in Tables 16 and 17 in this study, there was a substantial annual variation in the rate of 
Hispanic male joblessness reported by the ACS in Milwaukee between 2002-2004; these 
inexplicable fluctuations almost surely reflect measurement noise and not genuine shifts in the 
Hispanic jobless rate.  
Similarly, in comparing trends in black male jobless trends between 2002-2005 in our pool 
of “benchmark” cities and regions, there are a few anomalies in the ACS data. For example, 
between 2002-2005, there was a huge surge in the rate of black male joblessness in Cleveland 
and Pittsburgh; both cities rose from the middle of the rankings of Frostbelt cities to having the 
highest rates of black male joblessness. Yet, as the table below illustrates, the number of 
working-age black males fluctuates annually in both cities far too much to be credible. It simply 
is not plausible that the working-age black male population fell in Cleveland by 20.8% (13,106 
men) between 2002-2003, rose the very next year by 34.1% (17,066 men), and then fell again by 
12.0% (8,065 men) between 2004-2005. But, that is what the ACS reports. Clearly, the outer 
limits of sampling error were reached in these cases; but these examples are a warning to draw 
guarded conclusions on short-term shifts that show up in ACS data. (For the record, the 
fluctuations in measures of the working-age black male population in Milwaukee in the ACS 
data were much less volatile than in these cities). 
 
Number of Working-Age Black Males in 
Cleveland and Pittsburgh, 2002-2005, 
According to American Community Survey 
 
CITY 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Cleveland 63,092 49,986 67,052 58,987 
Pittsburgh 17,178 17,358 23,113 21,796 
 
 
With anomalies such as these, as we note in the study, context and longer time series are 
important in sorting out genuine trends as opposed to measurement variation; that is precisely 
what we have provided with the extensive historical data on male joblessness in Milwaukee in 
part V of this report.  
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Notwithstanding these caveats, the ACS provides the most up-to-date statistics on race and 
employment in U.S. cities and metropolitan areas and, used cautiously, can give us some sense 
of the most recent trends. 
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Milwaukee Center for Economic Development, 2003), pp. 22-26; and Marc V. Levine, After the Boom: Joblessness 
in Milwaukee Since 2000 (Milwaukee: UW-Milwaukee Center for Economic Development), pp. 13-18.  
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